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In 1996, Kyrgyzstan signed a Treaty on Eternal 
Friendship with Uzbekistan. At that time, 
many observers predicted that such friendship 
would grow in strength. Kyrgyz diplomats 
saw Uzbekistan as a natural ally because of 
their common past and present challenges. 
Kyrgyz statesmen also saw Uzbekistan as a 
reliable partner in resisting pressure from their 
formidable neighbor, China. 
Ironically, in the years that followed, China 
turned out to be the more reliable and 
predictable partner for Kyrgyzstan, while 
the “eternal friendship” with Uzbekistan saw 
cracks form right after the signing of the 1996 
document. The period of initial cooperation 
gave way to a protracted period of tension, and 
even to episodes of outright hostility. Against 
this backdrop, it became evident that few 
Kyrgyz diplomats possessed the necessary 
expertise and knowledge about Uzbekistan, 
or the environment in which its political elites 
operate. The same was true of Uzbek foreign 
policy makers.
Perhaps the greatest strain on relations was 
presented by the difference in strategies for 
economic and political development chosen by 
each country. While Kyrgyzstan chose a path of 
decentralization and liberal economic reform, 
Uzbekistan pursued a policy of economic 
protectionism and centralization of power in 
the hands of a single ruler. While Kyrgyzstan’s 
leaders committed themselves to democratic 
reforms, their Uzbek counterparts embarked 
on building a strong state that soon turned into 
a dictatorship. 
The difference in symbolic meaning between 
the mythical birds that appear on the Uzbek and 
Kyrgyz state emblems, Semurg (epitomizing 
national Renaissance) and Manas’ White Falcon 
(epitomizing a yearning for freedom), is perhaps 
representative of the prevailing values in society 
and differing trajectories of development. While 
the country of Semurg puts statehood above 
individual liberties and freedoms, the country of 
the White Falcon can go as far as to undermine 
its statehood when the ideals of freedom are 
at stake. Kyrgyzstan’s “Tulip Revolution of 
March and Uzbekistan’s Andijan events in May, 
2005  amply demonstrated this difference once 
again.
D e s p i t e 
d i f f e r i n g 
attitudes to 
the issues of 
statehood and 
demo-cratization, with resulting ideological 
preferences, the necessity for a long-term, 
mutually-beneﬁ cial relationship will always 
remain a key issue on the agendas of both 
countries. Despite its importance, Uzbekistan 
has not been in Kyrgyzstan`s top foreign 
priority agenda. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan`s 
policy toward Uzbekistan is characterized 
by inconsistencies and lack of transparency. 
Current policy attitudes on Uzbekistan seem 
to be determined mainly by spontaneously 
emerging needs of policy-makers to react in 
some way to numerous hindrances they face in 
bilateral relations.
This paper examines current problems and 
challenges in bilateral relations between 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. It also analyzes 
the institutional environments in which policy-
makers in both countries operate and obtstacles 
they face. Given all risks and difﬁ culties in 
bilateral relations, the paper argues that policy-
makers in both countries should have realistic 
expectations from each other. Conﬁ dence 
building measures and the policy of cautious 
incrementalism has to shape not only ofﬁ cial 
forein policy doctrines but also public policy 
attitudes.
Bilateral issues and mutual public 
perceptions
KYRGYZSTAN AND UZBEKISTAN: FROM ETERNAL FRIENDSHIP TO POL-
ICY-BASED ENGAGEMENT
Alisher Khamidov, PhD Candidate, Johns Hopkins University, USA
Kumar Bekbolotov, Director of Bishkek offi ce of the British Institute for War and 
Peace Reporting (IWPR).
Despite its importance, 
Uzbekistan has not been 
in Kyrgyzstan`s top for-
eign priority agenda.
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Following the 1996 agreement, several 
keystone events had a dramatic impact on public 
perceptions in Kyrgyzstan about Uzbekistan: 
the incursion of the Batken province by a group 
of Islamic militants in 1999 and 2000, the border 
delimitation crisis of 1999, the unsuccessful 
attempt by the two countries to swap enclave-
surrounding territories in 2001, the introduction 
of a visa regime in 2000 and the Andijan events 
of 2005. Among the recurring issues that affect 
Kyrgyz public’s perceptions of Uzbekistan 
are the annual negotiations on Uzbek gas 
and fuel as well as talks on water and energy 
regulation. These issues have usually resulted 
in a negative imagery of Uzbekistan. Recurring 
border incidents which include landmine 
explosions, shootings,  and physical assault 
of civilians by border troops of both countries 
have added to the atmosphere of tension.
Some  positive events that Kyrgyzstani public 
associates with Uzbekistan include the signing 
of the Treaty on Eternal Friendship, Kyrgyz-
Uzbek negotiations in multilateral institutions 
(SCO, CIS, Evrazes), material support from 
Tashkent that came right after the March 
events in 2005, and the infrequent Uzbekistani 
concessions to Kyrgyzstan related to the 
supplies of Uzbek gas.
While events played a key role, three key issues 
have dominated the agenda in bilateral relations. 
The ﬁ rst is related to border demarcation. The 
ﬁ rst is related to border demarcation. The 
second problematic area is natural resources 
and their management. The third problem area 
involves political issues. Each of these deserves 
particular attention because it has the potential 
to impact the dynamics of future relations.
Troubles at the borders
Uzbekistan’s 
e c o n o m i c 
p o l i c i e s , 
which favored 
protectionism 
and closed 
markets, prompted the Uzbek authorities to 
reinforce their borders with all their Central Asian 
neighbors. In 2000, Uzbekistan imposed a visa 
regime that applied to the citizens of Kyrgyzstan. 
While residents of southern Kyrgyzstan are 
allowed to travel up to 100 kilometers into 
Uzbekistan or to transit this territory, more 
extensive travel (such as to Tashkent) requires 
a visa. Kyrgyzstan responded by instituting a 
similar visa regime.
These restrictions disrupted traditional 
patterns of trade and social interaction in the 
Ferghana Valley. The rich cultural exchange 
that characterized the region for centuries has 
become minimal. The fact that neither country 
maintains a consulate in any of the border cities 
is a source of frustration for many residents. 
For example, according to this arrangement, 
residents of Osh, ﬁ ve kilometers from the Uzbek 
border, need to travel 600 kilometers north to 
the capital, Bishkek, in order to receive a visa 
for travel within Uzbekistan. Similarly, residents 
of Andijan need to obtain a visa in the Kyrgyz 
embassy in Tashkent, which is 350 kilometers 
away. 
Following bomb blasts in Tashkent in February 
1999, Uzbekistan fortiﬁ ed the borders in the 
Ferghana Valley as a security measure. Attacks 
by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
during the summers of 1999 and 2000 pushed 
Uzbekistan to take strong steps again. In August 
1999, the Uzbek Air Force launched air strikes 
against alleged IMU positions in southern 
Kyrgyzstan, reportedly without the consent of 
the Kyrgyz government. Similarly, the Uzbek 
security services operated on Kyrgyz territory 
to capture suspected Islamic extremists. These 
activities caused public outcry in Kyrgyzstan 
and contributed to poor relations along the 
border. 
Other problematic areas also caused concern 
for Kyrgyzstani citizens. Territorial disputes 
and the process of border demarcation have 
long been sources of friction between the two 
countries. Joint work to demarcate the Kyrgyz-
Uzbek border began in February 2000, but 
has proceeded very slowly. According to the 
International Crisis Group, by February 2002 
only 209 out of 1,400 kilometers had been 
jointly demarcated, although 994 kilometers 
had been studied. The most contentious points 
are the 406 kilometers in Osh and Batken 
regions, which are still being studied by the 
joint commission.
The rich cultural ex-
change that character-
ized the region for centu-
ries has become minimal
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Demarcation negotiations are impeded by the 
presence of ﬁ ve Uzbek enclaves on Kyrgyzstani 
territory. Two in particular have received much 
media attention, Sokh and Shahimardan, both 
in the Ferghana Valley. Because Uzbekistan 
has long viewed these enclaves as strategically 
important for its security, it sought land corridors 
that would connect the enclaves with the 
mainland. In 2001, a secret memorandum on 
land corridors that was signed between then 
Uzbek Prime Minister Utkir Sultanov and the 
Kyrgyz premier Kurmanbek Bakiev created a 
political scandal in Kyrgyzstan. The opponents 
of the memorandum argued that it would 
effectively cut off the Batken province from 
Kyrgyzstan.
Another problematic aspect of the border 
delimitation process is unilateral demarcation 
attempts and the mining of borders. There have 
been cases of unsanctioned seizure of land by 
local communities living in villages adjacent to 
the borders. In 1999, the Uzbek border guards 
began planting landmines on territories that are 
regarded as disputed. The move, which was 
originally designed to thwart the inﬁ ltration of 
Islamic militants, ended up causing numerous 
civilian casualties. Since 1999, more than a 
dozen Kyrgyzstani citizens as well as tens of 
Uzbekistani citizens became victims of mine 
explosions. Under international pressure, 
Uzbekistan began removing the landmines. 
However, there are claims in the Kyrgyz press 
that some areas along the border have not 
been completely cleared of mines. 
There are numerous press reports that depict 
widespread practices of harassment, extortion 
and even attacks by the border troops of both 
countries on ordinary travelers. In recent years, 
incidents have been reported of border troopers 
opening ﬁ re on civilians without a particular 
reason.
The Resources Curse
Two commodities - water and energy - have 
long served as a source of tension. Uzbekistan 
is a major supplier of natural gas to Kyrgyz 
consumers. Kyrgyzstan controls the water 
supply to Uzbekistan, especially its Ferghana 
Valley provinces. For several consecutive 
years, the Uzbek suppliers of natural gas cut 
off the gas supply to Kyrgyzstan, claiming 
that Kyrgyzstan has a large outstanding debt. 
Kyrgyz ofﬁ cials claimed that the Uzbeks have 
not paid for  water. Uzbek ofﬁ cials claim that 
water is a freely available natural resource, and 
that the Kyrgyz should not charge money for it. 
Both parties often refer to a barter agreement 
signed in 1998. 
According to local experts, a major problem 
with this barter agreement is that it did not take 
into account the seasonal need of commodities. 
Kyrgyzstan is in great need of energy supplies 
in the cold winter months. It is not in much need 
of energy in the late spring or early summer – the 
very time when the downstream countries need 
water for irrigation. As frequently happens, when 
Kyrgyzstan is not convinced that enough gas, 
coal and mazut will be provided by Uzbekistan 
in winter, it protects itself by producing more 
electricity – thus dumping its water reservoirs 
in the winter months. 
The large amounts of water released cause 
the lakes to ﬂ ood. Up to 350,000 hectares of 
land in Navoi and Jizzak Provinces have been 
ﬂ ooded, and farms in Namangan Province are 
under threat. Roads and electricity lines have 
also been badly hit by ﬂ oods. According to a 
January 2002 Uzbek State Channel broadcast, 
ofﬁ cials have estimated the total damage 
inﬂ icted upon Uzbekistan at US$ 770 million. 
Some Uzbekistani ofﬁ cials threatened to 
take Kyrgyzstan to the International Court of 
Justice.
Uzbekistan has reportedly used Kyrgyzstan’s 
dependence on Uzbek gas to pressure it into 
concessions on political issues as well. For 
example, when Uzbekistan cut off gas supplies 
to Kyrgyzstan in 2001, the Kyrgyz press linked 
it with the Uzbek desire to compel Kyrgyzstan’s 
compliance with territorial demands and claims 
for land corridors to Uzbek enclaves. 
Political antagonism
Cooperation between Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan is additionally hampered by 
differences in the way the two states are 
governed. The more open society in Kyrgyzstan 
presents a challenge to President Karimov. In 
Uzbekistan, the media and dissemination of 
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information are tightly controlled, and there is 
little political pluralism. Puppet political parties 
have been set up by the regime to create 
an image of a democratic process. Open 
discussions on policies and policy outcomes, 
which were tolerated to a certain degree in the 
early 1990s, have become rare in Uzbekistan. 
According to the IPP’s numerous informal 
interviews with Uzbek ofﬁ cials, the desire “to 
please the boss” prompts many ofﬁ cials at the 
local levels to control and limit the supply of 
information to the upper echelons of power. 
Although data on Uzbekistan’s process of 
forming policy, especially foreign policy, is 
sketchy, what is known is that policy-making 
is highly centralized. At the apex of policy-
formation is President Islam Karimov. As 
described below, his personal preferences 
determine the general course of foreign policy 
process. President Karimov’s administration is 
the dominant force within the policy-formation 
system. Within the administration, the state 
advisers to the President play a crucial role as 
gatekeepers to the President when deciding 
on foreign policy options. Based on ofﬁ cial 
press statements and interviews, many high-
ranking ofﬁ cials tend to rely on the National 
Security Service for data and information about 
neighboring countries, rather than on foreign 
policy institutions. 
Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, matters 
dealing with Kyrgyzstan have long been 
assigned to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) desk. Now the desk on the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
also deals with some of these matters. Other 
governmental agencies, such as Uzbekistan’s 
National Gas Company and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, contribute to policy formation, 
but they do not play a dominant role. As one 
Kyrgyz negotiator observed, Uzbek negotiators 
often cannot decide on even simple matters 
during bilateral negotiations on borders without 
referring back to Tashkent. The oblast (district) 
and rayon (region) administrations, which 
border Kyrgyzstan, are the least signiﬁ cant 
actors, despite the fact that they have a direct 
impact on policies imposed from the center. 
Although Uzbek ofﬁ cials claim that national 
interests drive Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, they 
have so far not been able to clearly formulate 
these interests. Rather, ideology, particularly 
President Karimov’s pronouncement that 
“Uzbekistan’s Future is as a Great State,” 
has long been the most salient aspect of the 
Uzbek foreign policy. Behind this ideological 
pronouncement, some Kyrgyz observers see 
hidden expansionist tendencies of Uzbekistan.
Against this backdrop, President Karimov’s 
statements sometimes add fuel to the ﬁ re of 
distrust. In a February 1999 radio interview, 
President Karimov accused Akaev of being 
unable to “do much of anything apart from 
smile.” This statement set public opinion 
in Kyrgyzstan against Uzbekistan. Kyrgyz 
parliamentary deputies demanded that 
cooperation with Uzbekistan be reduced and 
measures be taken to defend the dignity of the 
country. Some deputies in Kyrgyzstan were 
infuriated by former President Askar Akaev’s 
refusal to stand up to Karimov’s abuse, and 
were further annoyed by his reluctance to use 
Kyrgyzstan’s leverage as a supplier of water to 
Uzbekistan.
In the fall of 2000, in the run up to the Kyrgyz 
presidential election, relations between the 
two presidents warmed a bit. In keeping with 
personalized foreign policy, President Karimov 
ﬂ ew to Bishkek to personally support President 
Akaev. “If I were an ordinary Kyrgyz citizen, 
I would deﬁ nitely vote for my friend Askar 
Akaev,” Karimov told Kyrgyz journalists at a 
press conference. This statement was widely 
and cynically seen in Kyrgyzstan as a utilitarian 
move to strengthen Akaev’s candidacy, because 
Karimov could boss him around more easily 
than another potential president. Observers 
suggested that Karimov did not want a new 
Kyrgyz leader who would have been able to 
stand up to him. 
After this brief episode, relations turned 
sour again. Uzbekistan continued to blame 
Kyrgyzstan for lenient treatment of “Islamic 
extremists” in the Ferghana Valley. Following 
Although Uzbek offi cials claim that na-
tional interests drive Uzbekistan’s for-
eign policy, they have so far not been 
able to clearly formulate these interests
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the incursions of Islamic militants in 2000 and 
the Andijan uprising in May 2005, the Uzbek 
ofﬁ cial press claimed that “terrorists” have 
established training bases in Kyrgyzstan and 
used them to attack government buildings in 
Uzbekistan. In demanding the extradition of 
several hundred Uzbek citizens who found 
refuge in Kyrgyzstan’s Jalalabad region, 
Uzbekistan effectively accused Kyrgyzstan of 
“harboring terrorists.” 
While bilateral relations have been 
charachterized by tension and even hostility, 
the cooperation of the  two countries within 
multilateral organizations has been remarkably 
progressive.
Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations within multilateral 
regional organizations
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan’s relations within 
multilateral institutions have been most 
prominent in two organizations, the CIS and 
SCO. Paradoxically, within the Commonwealth 
of Independent State (CIS), Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan have put the most emphasis on free 
trade, economic integration, and cooperation, 
which obviously contradicts the real state of 
bilateral relations. 
More productive efforts at cooperation are 
noticeable within the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, where Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
have jointly pushed at least one serious initiative, 
that of questioning the further necessity of the 
American airbases in Khanabad and Manas. 
While Uzbekistan was swift to rid itself of the 
American airbase, Kyrgyz ofﬁ cials are using 
softer, ﬁ nancially augmented tools to wedge out 
the Americans. In 2003, Uzbekistan lobbied for 
moving the SCO Regional Antiterrorism Center 
from Bishkek to Tashkent, and positioned itself 
as the military powerhouse of Central Asia. 
Uzbekistan was also part of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
that unites Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia, but left in 
1999, following its independent, anti-Russian 
posture. Yet, due to the Uzbek-Russian 
rapprochement following Andijan, talks are 
currently underway on Uzbekistan re-joining this 
organization. According to CSTO agreements, 
Kyrgyzstan hosts a military airbase in Kant, 
which was previously viewed with suspicion by 
Tashkent. Uzbekistan may also agree to host a 
Russian airbase instead of American troops in 
Khanabad.
Since 2002, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have 
been part of the Organization for Central Asian 
Cooperation (OCAC). Despite a number of 
promising head starts, real cooperation within 
this organization’s framework has been hardly 
noticeable.
On June 13, 2006, the Kyrgyz parliament 
ratiﬁ ed Uzbekistan’s joining of the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EEC). In October 2005, 
Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining the 
EEC, promising that it would implement all EEC 
rules and procedures immediately after joining. 
Yet, as of June 2006, there were concerns that 
Uzbekistan was delaying the implementation of 
some customs and tariffs regulations. 
Leaders’ interest in cooperation or avoidance 
of cooperation is inﬂ uenced by a set of 
assumptions they hold about each other. We 
now turn to these.
Public assumptions that affect the foreign 
policies of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 
towards each other
It is important to understand the assumptions of 
Uzbek policy makers that affect foreign policy 
towards Kyrgyzstan. It is equally important to 
distinguish elite assumptions from popular 
assumptions. Based on numerous informal 
interviews with Uzbek ofﬁ cials and citizens, the 
following general assumptions are discernible:
Elite assumptions
Kyrgyzstan is politically and militarily weak state.
A small country the size of two of Uzbekistan’s 
provinces in population, it is also a hotbed 
of political and economic problems. Several 
episodes support this assumption. The ﬁ rst is 
related to Kyrgyzstan’s handling of the Batken 
crisis, in which a group of Islamic militants were 
able to inﬁ ltrate Kyrgyz territory without difﬁ culty 
and succeeded in securing a ransom for some 
hostages. The second is related to the numerous 
protests that are allowed within the country, and 
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which led up to the Tulip Revolution. In the view 
of Uzbek ofﬁ cials, President Akaev’s weakness 
and inability to take a tough military stand on 
opposition led to his demise and to dangerous 
spillover effects in Uzbekistan.
Kyrgyzstan is a source of constant irritation.
Its liberal economic policy, namely its joining 
the World Trade Organization, is viewed as 
dangerous to Uzbekistan’s closed market and 
protectionist system. Kyrgyzstan is a source of 
natural resources, namely water and electricity. 
In the view of Uzbek ofﬁ cials, Kyrgyz ofﬁ cials 
are difﬁ cult to negotiate with, and do not always 
respect the clauses of agreements. What is 
particularly irritating in the view of Tashkent 
is that Kyrgyzstan insists on regarding water 
ﬂ ows as a natural commodity for sale, and 
wants lowland countries to compensate for 
water management costs.
It is important to note that the Uzbek authorities 
are trying to inculcate these perceptions among 
their citizens through state media broadcasts 
and publications. 
However, popular perceptions of Kyrgyzstan 
differ from those of the political elite. In the 
views of many ordinary people, especially 
in the Ferghana Valley, Kyrgyzstan is an 
economically dynamic and politically open 
society that tolerates opposition in many forms. 
Historically nomadic, the Kyrgyz have been 
able to achieve remarkable economic progress 
because of their closer ties to the international 
community and liberal economic policies. 
As one Uzbek journalist in exile told the IPP, 
“Karasuu market in Kyrgyzstan is visited by 
traders from all regions of Uzbekistan. They 
see that Kyrgyzstan has far less police ofﬁ cers 
and tax inspectors on the streets, but that 
people seem to live better despite this fact. 
Not a single road police station stopped us on 
the longest Osh-Bishkek highway. Contrary 
to Karimov’s statements, Kyrgyzstan gives an 
example of how an “Eastern” country can adopt 
liberal policies without harm.”
These perceptions prompt many ordinary 
Uzbek labor migrants to cross the borders daily 
in search of better pay. Uzbek traders smuggle 
goods to Kyrgyzstan to get better prices. 
In recent years, many ordinary believers in 
Islam from Uzbekistan have found refuge 
in Kyrgyzstan’s southern regions, ﬂ eeing 
persecution and torture in Uzbekistan. The 
ﬂ ight of Andijan refugees to Kyrgyzstan is the 
latest episode. 
Assumptions and myths guide not only the 
people in Uzbekistan, but also in Kyrgyzstan. 
From the early nineties onward, for part of the 
Kyrgyz public, especially in the south of the 
country, Uzbekistan’s image has been that 
of a highly orderly and stable country, which 
has managed to maintain a Soviet-era social 
welfare system and economic infrastructure. 
An average man would bring up the examples 
that, apparently, captured car thieves in 
Tashkent are immediately sentenced to capital 
punishment, and that in years with good 
cotton harvests, common farmers can easily 
buy Korean and Uzbek-made cars. President 
Islam Karimov was seen as a strong and tough 
leader, able to keep Uzbekistan from delving 
into chaos and disorder.
At the same time, many ordinary Kyrgyz citizens 
have become practically acquainted with the 
toughness of Karimov’s regime in a number 
of areas, including trans-border movements, 
trade, visa issues and so on, which effectively 
damaged Uzbekistan’s positive imagery. The 
Andijan events in May 2005 further exposed 
the full depth of social tension and internal 
political issues in Uzbekistan.
Constant coverage by Kyrgyz media outlets 
of the problematic areas in relations with 
Uzbekistan has formed a predominantly 
negative image of this country. The ﬁ ltered 
ofﬁ cial information coming out of Uzbekistan 
cannot compete with alternative coverage 
and reports, both from within the country and 
by foreign media outlets. Uzbekistan is now 
largely seen as a source of constant tension 
that represents a latent political, social, and 
even military threat to Kyrgyzstan. 
The wider Kyrgyz public has traditionally 
been discontent with the strict posture that 
Uzbekistan takes on many bilateral issues. 
Kyrgyzstan has always felt strong pressure from 
Uzbekistan in such issues as Uzbek refugees 
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in Kyrgyzstan, border issues, gas supplies and 
water management. 
Among the popular attitudes held in Kyrgyzstan 
about Uzbekistan are following: 
Uzbekistan is pursuing expansionist goals. 
Towards that goal, Uzbekistan is pursuing 
the policy of repatriating co-ethnics, similar 
to Russia’s compatriots policy. Uzbekistan’s 
ultimate goal is to carve out parts of the southern 
region of Kyrgyzstan, namely Osh and Jalal-
Abad oblasts, which have sizable ethnic Uzbek 
populations.
Uzbekistan is bankrolling some Uzbek leaders 
in south Kyrgyzstan to promote Uzbekistan’s 
interests. The latest demands in Jalal-Abad to 
give the Uzbek language an ofﬁ cial status is 
viewed as part of this broader agenda. Plus, 
Uzbekistan has never allowed the Uzbek 
community in Kyrgyzstan out of its informational 
media environment, with an unprecedented 
volume of Tashkent’s media inﬂ uence being 
exerted in southern Kyrgyzstan.
Uzbekistan retains an indirect, “soft power” 
inﬂ uence over Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic Uzbek 
minority. Uzbekistan’s TV and radio channels 
cover the whole of southern Kyrgyzstan. 
Uzbek political and cultural broadcasts have 
a signiﬁ cant impact on the political thinking 
of ethnic Uzbeks. For example, according 
to Morgan Liu, an anthropologist at Harvard 
University, in the late 1990s many ethnic 
Uzbek men in Osh had had a positive image 
of President Islam Karimov as a strong ruler, a 
Central Asian khan.
Uzbekistan will not hesitate to use military force 
to solve some bilateral issues. Many observers 
point at the 1999 bombing of Kyrgyz territory 
by Uzbek ﬁ ghter planes that were supposedly 
targeting Islamic militants. 
The fact that Uzbekistan is militarily more 
powerful than all other Central Asian states 
further strengthens the suspicion of Kyrgyz 
policy-makers. According to the UK-based 
International Institute of Strategic Studies, 
including reserves, the Uzbek military force 
stands at almost 130,000 men. Active forces 
amount to some 80,000 – 50,000 in the Army, 
9,100 in the Air Force, 18,000 in Ministry of 
the Interior units, and 1,000 in the National 
Guard. Manpower ﬁ t for service is estimated at 
about 5 million people. Following the Andijan 
crackdown, there are reports that Uzbekistan 
is further modernizing its military. 
These perceptions are widespread throughout 
Kyrgyzstan. Some ofﬁ cials, particularly at the 
local levels, believe that they are credible. 
However, scrutiny of empirical reality disproves 
these myths. First, Uzbekistan has not 
pursued a co-ethnic policy at all similar to the 
Russian compatriots policy. In fact, the Uzbek 
leadership in Tashkent has long viewed the 
ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
with suspicion. Uzbek state TV channels have 
claimed that the Islamic militants that targeted 
Uzbekistan in 1999, 2000, 2004, and 2005, 
were ethnic Uzbeks – citizens of Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. 
Second, a fundamental challenge to Uzbekistani 
security is derived from the weakness of 
neighboring states, particularly Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan, which makes Uzbekistan 
vulnerable to spillover effects. Uzbekistan has 
taken steps to isolate itself from Tajikistan’s 
civil war. Following the 2005 Tulip Revolution, 
Uzbekistan strove to limit the spillover impact. 
There are also concerns about the possible 
repetition of the outbreaks of inter-ethnic 
violence which occurred in 1990 between 
Uzbek and Kyrgyz inhabitants of Kyrgyzstan’s 
southern territories. Such violence could spark 
inter-ethnic and inter-state confrontations in 
the heart of the Ferghana Valley, which runs 
through these three countries. Uzbekistan, 
which is home to many ethnic minority groups, 
including Tajiks, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, is not 
interested in promoting the rights of co-ethnics 
precisely because of its bad treatment of its own 
ethnic minority groups and its fear of retaliatory 
co-ethnics policies by Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, 
and even Turkmen. 
Another angle of the issue comes from the 
fact that, according to the Kyrgyz Ministry 
of National Security, more than 90% of the 
membership of the Islamic party Hizb-ut-
Takhrir in Kyrgyzstan is ethnically Uzbek. As 
a result, religious persecution in Uzbekistan 
and the Hizb-ut-Takhrir issue have allowed for 
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unusual cooperation between Uzbekistani and 
Kyrgyzstani security forces in hunting down 
“religious fundamentalists.” Kyrgyzstan has 
long tolerated incursions of Uzbek security 
forces into Kyrgyz territory to arrest and detain 
Uzbeks with Kyrgyz citizenship. 
Conclusions
Several key factors explain the unpredictable 
and conﬂ ictual nature of relations between the 
two republics. It is evident that the political elites 
of the two countries know very little about each 
other or the environment in which they operate. 
As a result, they form their policies based on 
assumptions and myths rather than hard facts. 
The relations between the two countries have 
been markedly personalized. Individual leaders 
have played a far more predominant role in 
diplomacy than foreign policy institutions. 
Consequently, when the political leaders were 
at odds with each other, the relations between 
the two countries became sour. When the 
leaders were on good terms, relations were 
marked by cooperation. 
Many observers view the Treaty of Eternal 
Friendship between the two countries with 
cynicism. Regional leaders have disappointed 
the hopes of their citizens for the development 
of successful, mutually-beneﬁ cial bilateral 
relations.
Citizens bear the negative results of friction 
and tension in the relations between the two 
countries. Border restrictions disrupted the 
traditional patterns of trade and social interaction 
in the valley. The rich cultural exchange that 
characterized the region for centuries has 
become minimal. 
It is evident that these two countries – with fairly 
high level of interdependence— should develop 
interest-based and mutually beneﬁ cial relations. 
Current relations driven by personal preferences, 
one-sided calculations and unilateral actions, 
all accompanied with declarations of ‘eternal’ 
friendship, do not seem to live up to the hopes 
of population and interests of country leaders. 
The governments of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
should try to use cultural and linguistic 
closeness and their shared desire to have a 
stable and peaceful Ferghana valley for the 
incremental and progressive development of 
relations . Establishing robust mechanisms and 
institutions, and resolving issues in a systematic, 
transparent and pragmatic ways will  help to 
make the friendship stronger if not eternal.
Consequently, when the political leaders 
were at odds with each other, the rela-
tions between the two countries became 
sour these interests
THE PHILOLOGY OF INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN KYRGYZSTAN
Muratbek Imanaliev, President of the Institute for Public Policy  
National minorities are usually outsiders – 
usually, but not always and not everywhere. 
Examples to the contrary include whites in 
the Republic of South Africa and Chinese in 
Malaysia.
For Kyrgyz, who have attained the status of a 
state-forming or titular nation, the question of 
whether we have stopped to feel and identify 
ourselves as a national minority remains 
principal.  The point lies not in numbers or a 
titular status, but in worldview and patterns of 
action.
The Kyrgyz nation, the eleventh republic, and 
consequently the eleventh nation in soviet 
ranking, a national minority in this sense, has 
suddenly become the majority, the ﬁ rst nation. 
What sensations and what changes has this 
primacy brought about? As it turned out, the 
comprador elite of Kyrgyzstan, established 
during the soviet times, was not ready to 
respond and take appropriate actions. 
For the Kyrgyz, the situation is full of controversy, 
discrepancy and destruction, rather than 
creative construction. Mechanisms of self-
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identiﬁ cation, besides those which have been 
mythologized, have not presented themselves. 
Kitchen ethnic egoism suddenly entered politics 
in the form of pronouns – “we” versus “they.” 
Moreover, this dichotomy became a political 
issue not only for the Kyrgyz but for Russians, 
Uzbeks and others as well. “We are the majority, 
and you are living on our land” – is the ﬁ rst 
slogan and ideologem of the independence 
handed to us by Moscow. 
“We? Where do we live?” – Tremulous 
exclamations of new national minorities began 
to be heard. This is when the virtual, spiritual/
mystical emigration of people of non-titular 
ethnicities started. For many of these people, 
though they actually lived in Kyrgyzstan, in their 
hearts they were in their historical homelands, 
which had not been particularly welcoming 
towards them, and mainly used the emerging 
situation for the purposes of cynical politics. 
Later real emigration also began. 
There is nothing chauvinistic or nationalistic 
in the desire of the Kyrgyz to build their own 
nation-state. This is what everyone wants 
– Kurds, Uygurs, Basques, and many others. 
However, it is necessary to build it together with 
all who live on this land, as Kyrgyzstan is their 
homeland as well.Our nation-state should be 
build by helping national minorities to develop 
their culture, speak in their mother tongue, etc. 
On the other hand, national minorities are 
obliged to assist the Kyrgyz to create this 
nation-state. There is no other place on the 
Earth for the Kyrgyz. We, the Kyrgyz should 
correctly explain this goal to all.  Everyone else 
has a so-called historical Motherland beyond 
Kyrgyzstan, but for the Kyrgyz it is only here. 
Kyrgyzstan should become a real Motherland 
for all, including the Kyrgyz. 
How should we, the people living in Kyrgyzstan, 
be called? For example, people living in the 
USA call themselves Americans regardless of 
their origin, in Canada – Canadians, in France 
– French, etc. Is the name “Kyrgyzstani” widely 
used? I am afraid not. When abroad, a Kyrgyz 
says he is a Kyrgyz, and a Russian or an Uzbek 
call themselves Russian or Uzbek; the best that 
they can say is “I am from Kyrgyzstan,” but not 
“I am a Kyrgyzstani.” 
We, the citizens of Kyrgyzstan, continue to be 
divided into “we” and “they.” “They want to oust 
us.” “They do not want to speak Kyrgyz.” “They, 
they, they” – “We, we, we.” Do we understand 
each other? This is a further question. 
In the ﬁ eld of legislation, the issue of national 
minorities is not resolved yet, except for some 
brief provisions in the Constitution and a small 
number of legal acts. The same goes for 
international conventions and intergovernmental 
agreements. Serious development of a legal 
basis for this issue is needed. 
However, public agreements, further 
transforming into traditions and customs, are 
equally important. The role of public spokesmen 
and leaders, regardless of their national origin, is 
very critical in this context. They should become 
the locomotives for the process of interethnic 
integration, based on public agreements and 
public political education, all within the larger 
process of forming the Kyrgyzstani civil and 
socio-economic space. “They” should be not 
within the country, but beyond its boundaries. 
“We” are here – all here. A nation is co-
citizenship. We should all understand this point 
– all, without exception. 
The unhealthy attitude of the Kyrgyz towards 
the requests of our national minorities is a 
residual inertia of the long period during which 
we ourselves were a national minority. This 
point is where distortions regarding needs of 
the Russian and Uzbek speaking populations 
originate. Added to this problem, the impact of 
external inﬂ uence is not at all insigniﬁ cant. 
Two problems in particular lie on surface of 
interethnic relations – cadre selection and 
language. Subsurface layers of these relations, 
including problems of ethno-psychological 
compatibility, are under-studied. Moreover, our 
national psychology, existing in a permanent 
condition of crisis, remains in a constant state of 
depression, the way out from which is through 
On the other hand, national minori-
ties are obliged to assist the Kyrgyz 
to create this nation-state
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either aggression or exit from the country. There 
exists no sound third way as of yet. 
Where cadres are concerned, the system of 
selection and placement of people in positions, 
inherited from Akaev’s regime, infringes not 
only the rights and opportunities of national 
minority representatives, but also those of the 
Kyrgyz themselves. This point is illustrated by 
the following picture: Does Kyrgyzstan need 
graduates, let us say from Harvard University, 
for civil service? If there is no support from the 
top, then no. Cadres are selected not based on 
the needs of the state, but more on personal 
needs, personal loyalty, or through the “corrupt 
accounts department.”
Therefore, the Kyrgyz as a whole should probably 
not be blamed for “Kyrgyz-orientedness” 
in the selection of cadres, but rather those 
Kyrgyz who undertook the formation of state 
institutions, particularly institutions of ethnic 
representation, who (together with others) could 
not manage to establish a civilized system of 
public administration. 
When the leadership is criticized because 
representatives of this or that national minority 
are not present in state bodies, it usually 
responds by providing a list of persons who 
hold some state positions: here is a Russian, 
here is a Korean, etc. However, this tactic only 
proves the inefﬁ ciency of the cadre policy of 
the country’s leadership. 
Serious reforms are needed, and everyone 
should be involved in their implementation, 
including that of cadre policy. Appointments 
should be made not by one individual, but 
through a public/state commission which would 
screen every applicant.
Regarding the problems with languages – in 
essence, the shift of state languages is a strug-
gle between Kyrgyz politicians, not a program 
of ethnic minorities. Above all, the Kyrgyz 
themselves cannot grasp this issue, discuss-
ing among each other a multitude of signiﬁ cant 
and minor factors. Therefore, this confrontation 
is more intra-ethnic than interethnic, and falls 
into a multitude of components, including ur-
ban-rural.The Russian language, as an ofﬁ cial 
language, has more international utilitarian im-
portance. There is no other language in Kyr-
gyzstan that can play this role. As English is not 
yet the language of the elite of Kyrgyzstan for 
international communication, this role is played 
by the Russian language. Everyone should un-
derstand this point. We need a linguistic/infor-
mational outlet to the world, which is Russian 
for the time being. 
Addressing the issue of making other languages 
ofﬁ cial is lawful in principle, but only from the 
point of international precedent, which must be 
understood.
Other languages are loosing to Russian in the 
competition for lingua franca status because 
the Russian language is also a linguistic-
cultural heritage, not only for all nations living in 
Kyrgyzstan, but also for all Central Asian states 
(besides what was stated above). It is the 
Russian language which is not only a language, 
but also an information/communication channel 
connecting the countries and peoples of the 
region. There is no common Turkic or English 
language in this quality yet. 
On the other hand, giving the status of an ofﬁ cial 
language to one or two more languages in our 
country is a way to form linguistic feudalism, 
which indirectly contradicts to the principle of 
the unity of Kyrgyzstan. 
It is obvious that Kyrgyzstan needs a concept 
for national development that is both serious 
and common. For the time being, Kyrgyzstan is 
the only country in the region that does not have 
such a concept. The challenge that Kyrgyzstan 
faces is not an easy one. In this respect, we 
(all Kyrgystanis) should understand that we are 
vulnerable in many respects. The major element 
in forming a concept should be common value 
guidelines, among which the idea of “nation as 
co-citizenship” should be principal.
Other languages are loosing to Russian 
in the competition for lingua franca sta-
tus because the Russian language is also 
a linguistic-cultural heritage, not only for 
all nations living in Kyrgyzstan, but also 
for all Central Asian states
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Muratbek Imanaliev: We, politicians and 
energy specialists, have all noticed that major 
investments currently ﬂ ow into the energy sector 
of Tajikistan. As is known, Russia has invested 
big money into the construction of hydroelectric 
power stations; Iran will also invest about 300 
million dollars; and investments have come 
from the EU and even from America. One gets 
the impression that all energy belts and lines 
bypass our country and run geographically to 
the left – to Tajikistan and Afghanistan. I believe 
that the day is not too far in the future when the 
power systems of Tajikistan and Afghanistan 
will be linked in some way. In light of the events 
in Afghanistan, an alternative option appeared, 
and Tajik policy has skillfully taken advantage 
as far as I know. The other line also bypasses 
Kyrgyzstan and runs through the territory of 
Kazakhstan and China. 
From my point of view, our country is becoming 
isolated. Even transport arteries have begun 
bypassing Kyrgyzstan from south-west and 
south-east, heading to China and other Asian 
countries. Unfortunately, ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows have 
always evaded our country. Although it is known 
that one trillion dollars circulate in the world 
each day, not a single penny ﬂ ows here. What 
does this situation indicate to us? First of all, it 
indicates the lack of energy policy. At the core of 
such a policy, I see the issue of energy security 
as one of the three main constituents of overall 
economic security; energy is the basis for any 
development. Even humanitarian problems are 
interlinked with the energy sector. A person 
with energy capacity is ready for development. 
Human communities that mastered ﬁ re moved 
forward, while those that could not master 
it as a tool of development were not able to 
develop further. Therefore, the challenge today 
is to develop and implement energy policy. This 
issue is about our internal problems. It not only 
involves the development of conceptual issues, 
but also the personiﬁ cation of energy issues in 
Kyrgyzstan, as well as some economic projects 
that could enable us to secure ourselves. 
The question is also about our international 
relations, because in such a small country as 
Kyrgyzstan, the export of electric power and 
energy resources in general is a very important 
element.
I think that if we linger this way further, there will 
soon be no one to whom we may sell electric 
energy. Ten years ago, we had the task to 
export electricity to China. Currently, there are 
two obstacles hindering the export of electricity. 
First, the increase in power production in China 
– according to their eleventh ﬁ ve year plan, 
production in 2006-2007 will equal a colossal 
ﬁ gure – approximately eighty thousand 
megawatts. For comparison, in Russia this 
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ﬁ gure constitutes 1.6 thousand megawatts: 
thus, the volume produced in China is forty-
ﬁ ve times greater. Uzbekistan, as far as I 
remember, was not heavily in need of electricity, 
and we had fragmentary cooperation with 
Tajikistan. Kazakhstan remains; however, it 
is not particularly interested in our electric 
power, as only two regions of Kazakhstan 
border Kyrgyzstan. I believe that entities will 
nonetheless appear that need electricity from 
Kyrgyzstan, although we may be late. 
I would like to address a question to Tayirbek 
Duyshenovich: Does such a policy exist in our 
country? If yes, what is the concept of it? If no, 
what should be the essence of such a policy?  
Tayirbek Sarpashev: It is painful for me to 
see how money that should had been invested 
into the Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2 
hydroelectric stations ﬂ ew away into Tajikistan. 
As far as I know, negotiations ﬁ rst started with 
our country. We met several times with the top 
management of the Russian Federation and 
major energy industries of Russia. However, 
nothing went beyond negotiations for some 
reason. Of course, here I see problems in the 
legislative framework as well – one must start 
from oneself and not blame others. A certain 
role was played by the special status of the 
Toktogul Hydroelectric Power Station and by 
the fact that that all hydroelectric power stations 
belong to the state, which cannot sell them. 
Second is the high level of corruption amongst 
not only powermen, but also the top political 
leadership in general. Here we have not the 
power of law but the law of the powerful. There 
is no transparent policy, not only in the power 
sector, but also in other ﬁ elds. The instable 
political situation that persisted in Kyrgyzstan 
over the last year also played a considerable 
role. We lost a year, which is equal to losing 
2-3 years. I blame the corrupted system in this 
regard.
Third, I am surprised by the position of the 
Government. When a member of the previous 
Parliament, I worked as the Committee Chairman 
and faced energy issues closely. Governmental 
structures worked with us deputies very poorly. 
We discussed all the issues in a dialogue 
format, and would raise them by means of the 
mass media. People themselves would choose 
the position they deemed right; we did not 
impose anything. It was decided that there was 
need to reform the energy sector, and that it 
was necessary to bring it closer to international 
standards. Investors will not come only due to 
our hospitality; they will come when business 
becomes standardized. Businessmen rely 
on business standards that were developed 
decades ago, and we are not the ones to change 
them. Over the last year, the Government has 
done nothing to come closer to those standards 
besides blaming the parliament about blocking 
projects. I will not deny that during the previous 
parliament the Government resorted to utilizing 
its own administrative resources. Nowadays, 
the Government does not have the objective of 
reforming the energy sector. There are signiﬁ cant 
controversies between the Government 
and the Parliament, between the President 
and the Government. The tandem plays a 
negative role in cadre issues today, as each 
is interested in strengthening his own position. 
Unfortunately, the energy sector, Kumtor and 
Djeruy in particular, became not an economic 
issue, but a political tool for the liquidation of 
opponents from the political arena. In such a 
case, truth is always lost somewhere, and with 
the aid of such polemics the opposition and the 
Government speculate on this topic, using it 
as propaganda, drawing people to their side. 
This is a real obstacle, one of the major factors 
which impede our development. 
Just yesterday evening, we met with a 
representative of the World Bank who said, “This 
is our last attempt to help you reform the energy 
sector; you should ‘jump on the last wagon of the 
departing train.’ If we leave, we will not be here 
any more.” The World Bank is an international 
institution, and it often applies a ﬁ rm approach 
to the solution of many issues. It wants to bring 
us closer to international standards. They imply 
European standards, but our social “cushion” 
and economic capacity does not allow us to 
implement such cardinal changes. We are 
late by 5-6 years with concessions and other 
issues, as things that could have been done in 
2001 have not yet been done. The opposition 
of that time, which currently holds the power 
– President Bakiev, Ishenbay Kadyrbekov, 
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Ismail Isakov, Usen Sydykov – were actually 
the ones who blocked the project on reforming 
the energy sector in order to depose the power. 
They used the project for ideological purposes, 
and assured everyone that the leadership 
wanted to sell the energy sector. The current 
opposition, after giving some thought to the 
matter, took up the same weapon, and is using 
it against the current power. 
When elections were held last year, I compared 
the composition of the old convocation of 
the 60-person Legislative Chamber with the 
composition of the new 75-member parliament. 
The current convocation of the parliament 
mainly consists of economists, the ones who 
created the system. They know the market, 
administrative resources, and evolutionary 
development of the market. They know what 
these factors are, and they also know that 
the laws of the market are fundamental and 
cannot be replaced by anything. However, the 
opponents of the reforms of the energy sector 
prevailed. When I talk with them, I explain to 
them the need for reforms, and they agree. 
Now, no political resources are left to carry 
out the reforms. In order to realize reforms, 
the top political leadership should have a 
strong capacity. Because of their corruptibility, 
family business, the capacity is exhausted 
and any undertakings of the President and the 
Government will be blocked by the Parliament. 
Why is this the case? It is so because the 
Parliament does not trust the President or Prime 
Minister, as they see how they tackle the power 
industry and what scheme they promote. Over 
the last year, they rose to a qualitatively new 
level of corruption, at the level of ideology now. 
When the opposition tries to do something, they 
are divided into Southerners and Northerners. 
It is impossible to carry out reforms in such an 
environment, as there is no trust. I know that 
when reforms are under way it hurts. Comparing 
it with a living organism, I see reforms in the 
state as surgery on the organism. If one trusts 
the competence of the surgeon, one lies on 
the surgery table. If one does not, one takes 
painkillers and goes to a shaman. Parliament 
does not trust the current power. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: As I have understood, 
there is no energy policy per se; it is nonexistent. 
There are populist statements related to politics 
and the struggle for power. The next question is 
for Nadejda Stepanovna and Ilyas Abdulovich: 
How does the Government understand energy 
policy, and how can it be implemented?
Nadejda Davletalieva: Currently, we have 
very many proposals on the investment of 
resources into the construction of the cascade 
and the renovation of the Heating and Power 
Station of Bishkek City, where there are 
signiﬁ cant problems as well. Nonetheless, as 
the Heating and Power Station also falls under 
the jurisdiction of the law on the special status 
of the Toktogul Hydroelectric Power Station, the 
basis for reform is to introduce amendments 
into that law, regardless of what is proposed 
or by who. Even back in 2004, when we 
signed a Memorandum with Mr. Chubais, one 
of its provisions stipulated the introduction of 
changes through the legislative framework. In 
the same year, a contract on the development 
of Feasibility Studies was signed, meaning that 
we proceeded forward considerably in 2004. 
In addition, in June of 2004 the Government 
came up with a draft bill on the introduction of 
changes into the law on special status. The 
draft bill proposes to exempt uncompleted 
construction from the jurisdiction of the law 
on special status. However, this draft bill has 
neither been considered nor adopted. When the 
negotiations were resumed this year, the issue 
on how to amend the legislative framework 
arose again, as it is one of the major obstacles 
impeding cooperation. Members of Parliament 
Mr. Mamyrov and Mr. Artykbaev submitted a 
draft bill again. The draft proposes not only 
to exempt the uncompleted construction, 
but also mentions the Bishkek Heating and 
Power Stations 1 and 2, as investors for the 
construction of Heating and Power Station 2 
may be found. This draft bill is currently under 
review. 
We also talked about the necessity to give 
all distribution companies to concession. We 
visited Ust –Kamenogorsk recently, where 
there is a company which invested signiﬁ cant 
resources into all redeemed assets.  Several 
big objects have been constructed; that is 
to say, we saw speciﬁ c investments made. 
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They had taken distribution companies under 
their administration, as they understand that 
electricity and heating energy are generated, 
but money is not returned, which is the same 
problems that we have. Tedious and daily work 
with distribution companies must be carried out. 
Therefore, they incorporated the distribution 
into their administration. There the investments 
go to management. In any case, they used the 
administrative resources for ten years, and 
only last year did they divide District Electric 
Networks (RES) from the Power Distribution 
Companies (REK). Therefore, the policy of the 
government is unambiguously for restructuring. 
We support what was started back in 2001. All 
problems arise from the fact that we stopped 
even before halfway. Regardless of the number 
of draft bills submitted by the parliament, there 
are probably some deﬁ ciencies. Perhaps 
parliament is not that active. Possibly this 
is because until last year we had the State 
Energy Agency, which directly worked with the 
parliament very closely. 
Tayirbek Sarpashev: And who abolished it?!
Nadejda Davletalieva: The President. Now 
we have a National Agency for antimonopoly 
policy, and this department is subordinate to 
it. Overall, it results in dual policy. Ofﬁ cially, all 
functions of the state agency on energy seemed 
to be transferred to the permanent agency on 
antimonopoly policy. However, according to 
its status, the antimonopoly committee should 
not and cannot tackle many issues over which 
the state agency was formerly in charge. This 
is one aspect. The second one is that we 
are trying to do something now. We have the 
Verhne-Narynskiy (Upper Naryn) cascade on 
the agenda, as some investors contacted us 
regarding its construction. However, everything 
was planned until 2020; it was a long-term 
future perspective, and no speciﬁ c feasibility 
studies were prepared. As a rule, all energy 
facilities should be tendered. In this case, it 
turns out that we have nothing for which to bid. 
We do not have the right to violate the law, and 
we decided that if there was a speciﬁ c investor, 
then they would develop a memorandum and 
investment agreement which would regulate 
the relations between us. From the side of the 
Government there are no guarantees; we do 
Not give preference to any one. If an investor 
ready to invest money appears with a clear plan 
and develops an investment agreement, the 
Government guarantees him implementation 
of the legislative base that we have. This is the 
scheme.
A second investor arrived, willing to construct 
power stations in Sary Jaz, but his project is 
very expensive and we have the conclusion 
from Tashkent (Feasibility Studies would cost 
USD 120 million), but the investor rightly 
notes: “What if I prepare feasibility studies, 
and then someone else wins the bid? There 
are no guarantees that I will be able to regain 
at least half of the amount spent.” As a result, 
we told him that we agree in principle, and will 
support him if he wants to build in our country. 
Again however, he will develop an investment 
agreement and pass the approval of the 
Parliament.
Tayirbek Sarpashev: All over the world, 
energy resources will grow in price. This trend 
is very clear now. The price of oil increased 
from 12-15 dollars per barrel to 60-70 dollars: 
that is, it grew ﬁ ve times more expensive. 
Other energy consumers around us, as far as 
I know, produce a lot by burning black oil and 
coal in their heating stations. These resources 
are limited, and will be exhausted some day. 
Therefore, hydroelectric power generators 
have many opportunities emerging for them. 
They have a reliable source of energy: Once 
constructed, they can generate energy day 
and night without any need for a supply of 
mazut… It is possible to foresee the work of a 
hydroelectric station 10 -15 years ahead. If one 
investor comes, a second can also follow. 
Nadejda Davletalieva: However, who has 
expressed such a desire? By the way, the 
Russians want to work in Sary-Jaz.
Tayirbek Sarpashev: I have heard of Sary-
Jaz only this year. When the prices for oil went 
up, they started to look for alternatives, which 
means one person came. A second will also 
arrive; let’s wait…
Nadejda Davletalieva: In principle, we think 
that there is nothing seditious here. They 
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are very welcome to proceed with their work. 
However, no one provides any guarantees 
now.
Muratbek Imanaliev: I have such an 
impression that the question is not about 
perfect or imperfect legislation per se, but 
more about other things, such as a culture of 
abiding by law. I have also an impression that 
in our country (not originally and exclusively 
though) the legislation is abstracted from real 
life. Simply put, what is more effective in our 
country – the law or relative connections, the 
law or a telephone call? I do not want to say 
that we do not have a culture of abiding by law, 
or a political culture. Throughout the world, 
there are such examples as the Constitution of 
Mexico, which is the Constitution of the USA 
translated into “Turkmen language.” The issue 
is that in the States it worked, while in Mexico 
it does not, even though the Constitution of 
Mexico repeats every word of the Constitution 
of the USA. 
Why does this happen? I think that the human 
factor plays a signiﬁ cant role in this case, and 
therefore it does not matter what laws we adopt 
(we do not invent laws; we simply rewrite them 
from the Kazakh and Russian arsenal). I do 
not mean to offend the deputies, but the thing 
is that there are some circumstances, human 
qualities that do not provide for the solution 
of our problems within the framework of what 
is written, for example in the Constitution of 
the USA. In the same way, not every Russian 
law can be applied here.   Therefore, I want to 
understand what the meaning of such a policy 
is.
Regarding Sary-Jaz I can say that this is a 
very complicated issue, as there the issue 
has to be coordinated with the Chinese, while 
the unfortunate Kambar-Ata Hydroelectric 
Power Stations need to be coordinated with 
Uzbekistan. Everything has to be thought out 
until the end. Here, as it seems to me, the 
applied part of our work, besides the legislation, 
is still very poor. Ilyas Abdulovich, I would like 
to ask you whether there is need to build these 
Kambar-Ata Hydroelectric Power Stations. In 
my opinion, it is ﬁ rst necessary to put in order 
what we already have. The ﬁ gures are horrifying: 
42% losses. Though the specialists say that 
this is not true, these are catastrophic data, 
which may exist elsewhere in Africa. During the 
Soviet Era, what we had was in a rather good 
state, while deterioration was caused mainly by 
the lack of money and outﬂ ow of specialists. 
Ilyas Davydov: Dear colleagues, ﬁ rst of all, 
thank you for the invitation. I came because 
open discussion takes place here. I have 
worked in the energy sector for 40 years, 
and frankly speaking, my heart aches now. 
The power industry is currently experiencing 
a terrible and difﬁ cult crisis. I think nothing 
like this has happened anywhere. Why is it 
happening this way? I think that not only we, the 
deputies, but also the people in general know 
why this is happening. First, I want to say that 
the Kyrgyz energy system is unique. As we all 
know well, hydroelectric resources were built 
during the Soviet Union, and there was excess 
supply of electric power. With the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, we managed to shift from 
2.5 million cubes of gas, 600 thousand tons 
of black oil, and 4.5 million tons of coal to 
electricity by the introduction and construction 
distributors of other networks. We occupy the 
second place in the world after Norway in using 
electricity for communal and household use. If 
in summer the daily consumption of electricity 
is eighteen million kilowatt-hours, in winter it 
increases up to sixty-six million kilowatt-hours. 
Electricity is consumed for electrical heating, 
food preparation, and by 4000 facilities: 
schools, hospitals, and communal facilities. For 
example, in winter, in Naryn alone about 91-92 
% is used for these purposes, and the average 
winter consumption on the national level is 72%. 
Even if we drive through the country and look 
around, there are practically no houses with 
smoke from the chimney. The use of electricity 
is safe; they should pay us for it. 
I used to work in the Ministry of Energy Industry 
of the Soviet Union, and of the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Commitment to the energy sector was high 
in all aspects – technical equipment, cadres, 
professionalism, patriotism, etc. Great people 
worked at that time, heartily committed to the 
development of the energy industry. 
The second positive aspect is that upon the 
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collapse of the Soviet Union, world prices on gas 
were limited, the supply of black oil stopped, and 
the volume of coal mining decreased.  We were 
the ﬁ rst country in Central Asia by the volume 
of coal mining, which stood at 4.5 million tons at 
that time. Later, the president made a decision: 
“Let’s produce at least a million tons.” Yet, even 
that was beyond our possibilities. Currently, a 
maximum of 100 thousand tones are mined; 
aside from that, we import it. Therefore, a 
positive moment in the development of the 
electric power industry was that instead of 
these expensive resources, we resorted to the 
use of electricity. Earlier, the voltage in lines 
was about 130-140 V, while now there is not a 
single region where it is below 220 V, including 
even Batken, Naryn, and Issyk-Kul. 
The most adverse factor, as I see it, is a lack of 
management. No one tackles the issues of the 
energy industry in the republic. I think that the 
Prime Minister and Vice-Primer Minister should 
be managers of the company. Reform and a 
shift from state ownership were carried out at 
a rapid pace.   I took part in the meeting with 
Chubais, the president of the electric power 
council. In 2000, we announced restructuring. 
“Who on Earth restructures and implements 
reforms in a winter period?” said Chubais. “You 
need to prepare for winter. Let me call A. Akaev.” 
I replied: “Let me call the president of the World 
Bank,” and we stopped it. After 3 years, Chubais 
came again and told me: “Davydov, I told you 
that we should call and stop everything. How 
can reforms be carried out when only 40% of 
the payment for electricity is being collected? 
You applied a negative upon another negative.” 
That is, mutual offsets impacted the situation in 
energy sector. 
The second factor is that energy industry 
issues are tackled in distribution companies 
by unprofessional, unpatriotic people who lack 
special knowledge. 
The third factor is that when the reforms 
were being implemented, I used to argue 
with Mederov [former Minister of Finance], 
insisting on launching a pilot project ﬁ rst, 
developing normative acts with the parliament 
and the agency, and further moving to speciﬁ c 
measures, etc. What were the results? Very 
high losses. In the winder period, we overload 
the power lines due to objective reasons, but 
we loose 48%. I also believe that we need to 
work on loss reduction. It should be done not 
under the activities plan, but at the level of a 
political and organization decision. How can the 
power industry be headless in a country where 
it is the basis of the national economy? The 
Vice-Prime Minister should work on water and 
power issues with the neighboring countries. 
Earlier, we earned 85 million dollars, supplied 
water, etc, while now we do not earn at all, or 
only 10-12 million dollars at the best, together 
with Kazakhstan. Moreover, we are the only 
country that does not have a national program 
on its power industry. Sixteen years have 
passed, and we have not yet agreed upon a 
plan with the parliament. I understand that this is 
complicated and hard work, but it has to be done. 
Furthermore, the development of hydroelectric 
power stations and the development of network 
facilities should be fully considered as part of 
the power complex, in connection with the gas 
and coal industry, etc. I think that the ﬁ rst task 
is management. The World Bank has not yet 
provided us with justiﬁ cations. Though we paid 
300 thousand dollars, we have not yet received 
the ﬁ nal documents. Therefore, I repeat that 
our ﬁ rst task is management. The second is 
restructuring the management of the power 
industry. Concession is needed. I support 
privatization, as the collection of payment is 
at a minimum level. The debt of the national 
network alone is 2.25 billion soms – how can 
energy sector manage this? 
I prepared our proposals about how to 
improve the situation both for the presidential 
administration and the government. Here is 
what they say about energy sector workers: 
“They are all thieves. They are all corrupted!” 
It hurts to hear these words, because there are 
electricians, mechanics, and repairmen who 
work day and night on the same cascade in 
the mountains, 4,000 meters above sea level. 
Recently, we spent 12 days in Frunzenskiy 
and Ala-Archa (on Sunday, a program “Energy 
Express” will be on TV). Ninety-eight persons 
worked on lines in the mountains; we organized 
food for them. Kazakhstan put a condition 
for us to leave parallel works. We told them: 
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“Leave. We have possibilities to work with you 
only if you do not play for transit.” They raised 
a question on the transit of their consumption. 
I believe that hydroelectric stations should 
be built simultaneously. There is shortage of 
electricity in the south of Kazakhstan, and the 
shortage will persist even if a second line is 
constructed.
In conclusion, I want to speak about the 
neighboring countries. In Tajikistan, electricity 
is supplied for only 4-5 hours per day. A large 
aluminum complex works there; 30% of the 
Tajik budget is spent on aluminum. Kazakhstan 
wants to build Mainap Hydroelectric Power 
Station by 2008. The issue is on the installation 
of one more line and working with China. 
Therefore, I believe that a political decision has 
to be adopted in Kyrgyzstan. If management 
will be created, I guarantee that losses will be 
reduced by 10% within a year. This statement 
is realistic. It is 1.5 billion kilowatt-hours. Out of 
these savings, it is possible to withhold tariffs, 
develop the economy, and contribute to the 
national budget. Kyrgyzstan is the only country 
where management is not in place. Uzbekistan 
is a state of joint stock companies, as you 
know. In all CIS states there are management 
systems, as management means energy 
security. If we gave away the National Electricity 
Network and stations, then there would be 
no need to drop bombs on Kyrgyzstan: just 
switching off two knife-switches could leave 
the country in complete darkness – that would 
sufﬁ ce. Therefore, the power industry should 
belong to the state. In Russia, the situation is 
as follows: 51% of all hydroelectric stations 
are state owned. The system operator is 
state-run; the federal network company is also 
state-run. Everything of a lower level is given 
to competition, privatization. I think that this 
experience should be used.  I rely on the wisdom 
of our president. On the 29th, a meeting will be 
held in which I hope the most serious decisions 
in favor of the energy industry and our people 
will be adopted. Thank you. 
Aigul Sultankulova: I will start by saying that 
when the State Agency for Energy Industry 
(actually a regulative body, the ﬁ rst regulative 
body in Central Asia) worked closely with 
deputies, I speak with no intention to offend 
the deputies, it took us three years to explain 
what a regulator was. For us, that was 
something unclear, new. It is a normal situation 
however, as regulative bodies are perceived as 
something negative in all countries. They are 
bodies that no one likes. They are meant to 
ensure a balance between the consumer and 
the producer. 
Secondly, all current problems existed before 
as well; it will take a long time to resolve them. 
We lack the most important thing – a strategy 
for developing the energy industry. What has 
been done was not a strategy, but a simple 
development plan. What does a strategy 
mean? We want to attract investors. What can 
attract investors? Clear, consistent plan and 
respect for owners’ rights. Investors will come 
only when they know that the rights of owners 
are respected in this country, and market 
and entrepreneurs will gain by this. Currently 
however, we have a situation in which the top 
level possesses a political will that everything 
must be elaborated two steps in advance. 
There is a layer of working people, and a layer 
of those who try to “hit the jackpot.” The latter 
attracts people who need to launder money. 
What strategic plan can we talk of in such a 
situation? The same type of investors, those 
what want to launder money, will come so long 
as we will sit with our interests as we do now. 
Paradoxical cases do happen. One company 
wants to come to the local market and 
submitted its proposals. This company wants 
to participate in the bid on the transfer of 
distribution companies to concession, which is 
the fourth stage of privatization, at which we 
have remained for 5-6 years, unable to manage 
to move further. This company was very heartily 
welcomed in Tajikistan. The issues is that 
they want to open a line that will run through 
Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also 
want Kyrgyzstan to be involved. 
We want to live on beneﬁ ts gained from selling 
electric power. However, it can happen that 
they will talk with them, accept their proposals, 
and that is all, because one of the principles 
that specialists of the AES (international energy 
company) abide by is not to bribe state ofﬁ cials. 
Absolute transparency must be in place. One 
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of the conditions runs as follows: if bribery is 
evident, the management of AES will suffer. 
This principle is adhered to, as they do not 
want to lose either their image or their work. 
Therefore, however we position ourselves, 
investors with the same approach will come to 
our country. 
Regarding tariff policy…. Deputies always 
reprimand us for a lack of tariff policy, but 
the quality and composition of the parliament 
was observed to have changed signiﬁ cantly. 
Economists sit there, yes, but their interests 
have acquired a political tinge. The previous 
leadership of the country, though also having 
economic interests, at least pretended that it 
was trying to reform the energy system. Now, 
in spite of the fact that educated economists 
are in the Parliament, there are open conﬂ icts 
of personal interests taking place. They all 
have their own businesses, and not a single 
business can exist without a supply of power. 
Therefore, many things are blocked at the level 
of the deputies’ personal interests. 
We have been accused of raising tariffs for 
those who consume up to 150 kW, but the 
presidential decree on protection of pensioners 
is used simultaneously. When everything was 
analyzed and estimated, it turned out that over 
a million consumers (62%) have some beneﬁ ts 
on payment. Those who consume much 
represent 5%, but pay for their consumption; 
budget employees represent another 5%; but 
believe me, they do not constitute a great 
number. The major part – the medium stratum 
– constitutes 28%, the part of the population 
which regularly pays for the consumed 
electricity. So the picture is not that scary. The 
most important thing that the deputies were 
accusing us of was when people paid double-
rate tariff – 43-80 tiyins. If we look at the reports 
of energy companies, we see that 70% of the 
population of Kyrgyzstan consumes less then 
150 kW. Average consumption is 110 kW. Not 
all consumers can use up 150 kW. Therefore, 
people did not pay the difference between 43 
and 80 tiyins. Today, those people who do not 
pay for electricity are automatically cut off. The 
difference goes somewhere, right? Where? To 
someone’s pocket, but not the national budget. 
The energy industry, besides inﬂ uencing life all 
over the country, also impacts the quality level 
in the country. Now it is possible to control this 
factor. I agree that we need to look at internal 
reserves, but this process is very difﬁ cult. We 
proposed in the past, and propose now to create 
programs and control the process, to see how it 
is done. It is very difﬁ cult to do so however. Much 
depends on the fact that we have institutional 
problems as well. I would be lying if I said that 
the composition of management cadres have 
changed qualitatively in comparison to what 
existed before. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: Thank you. Now we 
address the most critical parameters of what 
is called energy policy in Kyrgyzstan. It is 
important to look at the management of cadre 
policy as a critical policy component, and the 
ﬁ nancial and investment base. In countries with 
transforming economies, there is a problem 
with privatization. It is also part of politics, as 
it raises many discussions, especially here. 
The question on whether or not it is necessary 
to privatize was always the subject of ardent 
discussion in Kyrgyzstan. I would like to ask the 
following question: Should the energy system 
be privatized? If yes – then how? By a shock 
method, or like it was done in China – slowly 
gradually, etc? 
Abdyrashit Mukanbetov: According to 
our legislation, all issues on reorganization, 
restructuring, and privatization should be 
resolved according to the integral programs 
approved by Parliament. Such a program was 
approved with the participation of international 
experts and world donors from international 
banks. The program was successfully 
developed, derived from the experience of 
other developed countries, but neither the 
management team nor the staff were prepared 
for it. Certain problems appeared over the 
long years of Soviet power, and further within 
the vertically-integrated unitary systems of 
“Kyrgyzenergo.” This network was divided 
practically into seven independent companies. 
Managers were appointed over the distribution 
companies, who turned out to be unready for 
this position, and did not understand how to do 
accounting, energy balance, etc. 
The program on reorganization and privatization 
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of “Kyrgyzenergo” included four stages. 
Three out them we successfully completed 
by 2001, when the system was divided into 
seven companies. At this point, our reforms 
were delayed. One might say that we entered 
a mighty river, crossed almost half of it, and 
then stopped. Excuse me for saying this, but 
standing there all this time, we froze already. 
We cannot turn back in any case. Therefore, 
it is not right to discuss whether change is 
needed or not. We cannot stop the process: if 
we try to return to the previous state, it will lead 
to even worse consequences. When some say 
that “Kyrgyzenergo” had good indicators earlier, 
when it functioned as one entity, I do not agree 
with their opinion, as it is not fully correct. At that 
time, at the expense of the export of electricity, 
we had income. Consequently, the supply of 
fuel to Bishkek housing and fuel system was 
not that painful. Critical problems of a lack of 
resources for repair, upgrading the lines and 
equipment, were resolved by the supply of a 
sufﬁ cient amount of money. When dividing 
the dividends on the state package of shares 
in electrical stations, generating companies 
were divided in certain ratios. Up to now, a 
250 million som electrical station cannot pay 
dividends on its state package of shares, which 
is in principle ownership by the state. Electrical 
stations have 125 million soms of debt on their 
dividends, which is caused by the fact that 
distribution companies do not pay for their 
consumed energy on time. On the other hand, 
the policy pursued by joint stock companies or 
power generating companies leads to certain 
reﬂ ections: up to the present, we have not been 
able to ensure transparency in formulating 
a tariff policy. Though the former president, 
Akaev, said: “There is a consumer; sell a good 
and negotiate,” how are the negotiations held? 
This system still exists. 
I would disagree with Ilyas Abdulovich in the 
opinion that all problems are derived from the 
lack of a single administration body. In the 
2003 session of the Security Council devoted 
to this issue, a decision on the creation of a 
special committee and a special presidential 
representative on nuclear and electric power 
security was adopted. In three months, the 
rights given to this institution started to be taken 
back. Through three Presidential Decrees, 
the authority and jurisdiction of this institution 
were gradually curtailed. Actually, it turned 
into a statistics center, while in the beginning 
the secretariat of this representative pried to 
replace administration cadres. Here, phone 
calls from all different sides were made: the 
presidential administration and deputies. That 
is to say – nothing could be done. It is possible 
to recreate the state agency on energy and the 
base of the Ministry of Industry – which is the 
Ministry of Energy. However, if not provided 
with rights, it is useless and nothing will come 
out of it. 
Tayirbek Sarpashev: I want to add that 
this meeting is important, as it is not always 
possible to gather so many professional 
specialists together. You talked about special 
representatives and that the power is gradually 
is taking their authorities. As we have touched 
the issue of corruption, I want to say that 20 
thousand energy workers exist in the country. 
However, only 2-3 persons who were there 
under the presidency of Akaev remain there now 
a well – the same people; they have not even 
changed their surnames. They left on 24th, but 
returned the next day. Each time, policies are 
dictated by these 2-3 persons. They constructed 
the system in such a way that money ﬂ ows 
directly to their hand; they pump money from 
the energy industry. The political leadership is 
not willing to conduct reforms. They somehow 
report to international institutions, but continue 
to do the same thing as they did before. Until 
we overcome this obstacle, we will not move 
further. Deputies can be divided into three 
groups: The ﬁ rst one includes people who 
understand the need for reforms, but do not 
trust the current government or the president. 
The second are people who know what to do 
in order to depose the current power; they 
will work against it, using this problem as an 
ideological weapon. The third group does not 
understand anything. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: The question here is 
not that much about the energy industry and 
energy security. We have a deeper problem. 
Regardless of the regime, whether it is liberal 
or not, in our country, unfortunately, such a 
form of politics has established itself whereby 
personal interests, personal likes and dislikes, 
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become involved in the framework of state 
policy. In such a situation, it does not matter 
what kind of reforms are carried out. 
For example, all international institutions insist 
on extensive privatization, believing that it is 
the right thing to do. Right in which sense? 
Right from the point of view of the way in which 
western countries developed. I can say for sure 
that in Vietnam there are no privatized electrical 
stations. The energy system belongs to the 
state, and private investors do not have any 
share in it. Nonetheless, such a system works 
as well. We need to learn from our neighbors 
like China, Vietnam, and Cambodia. They have 
a unique system, which cannot be called either 
communist as the one we had or liberal as in 
the west. The Chinese gave a name to their 
system – “socialism with Chinese peculiarities” 
– avoiding deﬁ nitions that could prove unstable. 
It is socialism, but everything else which is 
unusual they refer to as Chinese peculiarities. 
Reforms carried out for twenty-ﬁ ve years have 
shown that economic, legal, state, and sectoral 
management is rather good, ﬂ exible, and allows 
for the achievement of objectives. 
How should the system of management of the 
energy industry be built in our country so that 
we will achieve success? With what does it 
correlate?
Nurdin Abdyldaev: If we glance back and look 
at who we have in power structures and who 
closes their eyes on all these problems, then, as 
a manage, I can say that we will not be able to 
avoid such a system. We are forced to adapt to 
it. People, especially welders, and electricians, 
need work. Above all, we need to advance to a 
new level of quality in state management and 
the management that administers us. We live 
in a society. Therefore, one needs either to be 
a revolutionary, or to accept life as it is. While 
there is dependence on those who head the 
energy system, until private owners come to 
our facilities there will be no order. I believe that 
efﬁ cient control over the energy industry will be 
possible if electrical networks are left under 
state control, and everything else is sold. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: Regarding corruption, 
it can be used either positively or negatively. 
For example in Northeast Africa, the interests 
of elite groups are not corporate, and therefore 
interests absolutely oppose each other; there 
are no common national interests. Meanwhile, 
in states of East Asia, China and South Korea, 
corruption exists, maybe to a greater extent 
then in Africa, but interests of the elite group 
are built upon the national interests, so that 
corruption actually acts as a driving force of 
progress. Here, unfortunately, we do not have 
such elite: business elite tried to rise, but 
were quickly defeated. Therefore, it is difﬁ cult 
to talk about any elite; but in any case, there 
are people who are trying to do something. 
However, the level of corporativity amongst 
the deputies is hardly reﬂ ected: each group 
promotes its own interests. The same deputies 
who previously supported reforms are against, 
them as they have particular interests now. I 
would like to address a question to our guest 
– Azamat Temirkulov. We would like to get the 
opinion of an independent expert: What should 
Kyrgyzstan do? Many nice words were spoken 
here, but how can we budge things? 
Azamat Temirkulov: Having heard the 
opinions of the specialist in this ﬁ eld, I have 
understood that corruption is the main problem. 
Until this problem is resolved, it will be difﬁ cult 
to move further. I conducted a small study: I 
had an idea about transferring the energy 
sector to concession, probably represented by 
international companies. The ﬁ rst question that 
arose was whether these companies would work 
for the interests of Kyrgyzstan, or pursue their 
own economic objectives. Probably there is an 
alternative way, and I tried to ﬁ nd it. There is a 
concept of developing the hydroelectric power 
industry, which is now being developed by the 
National Agency for Antimonopoly Policy. 
Aigul Sultankulova: Yes, there is such a 
concept, but it is similar to Kazakh concepts. 
Therefore, it is not possible to be sure of its 
success. So you understand, an analysis should 
be carried out to determine the necessity of it 
and whether it is applicable to our country. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: In general, Kazakh 
concepts do not always ﬁ t for Kyrgyzstan. 
Regarding investment, the issue is that we 
have a simpliﬁ ed understanding of investment 
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projects; we always try to politicize them. Let 
us take for example American investments in 
China: Americans invest money and create 
production. They produce certain goods, 
which are then transferred to the USA. What 
is the beneﬁ t for China? China gets taxes, 
work places, and some indirect proﬁ t, while 
at the national level China has a commodity 
circulation of over 700 billion USD. China 
invests this money into purchases of American 
state or private securities. 
It seems to me that a reform should take place 
foremost in our thinking – it should be reoriented. 
A person who invests money is not necessarily 
one who comes to steal or to appropriate. 
Nurdin Abdyldaev: Another moment: German 
investors work in our country exclusively within 
the framework of Kyrgyz legislation: they pay 
taxes, abide to all norms, etc. They get signiﬁ cant 
proﬁ ts, and also pay signiﬁ cant amounts in 
taxes. What is the beneﬁ t for Kyrgyzstan? First 
of all, there are 2000 work places in Tokmok, 
125 organizations that cooperate with these 
enterprises, which in turn imply several hundred 
work places. The Government did not have 
money to open and do what was done by the 
Germans. Protection of our national interests in 
the classical form should be as follows: before 
signing any agreements with an investor, it is 
necessary to discuss and reach agreement on 
everything: terms, conditions, responsibilities, 
rights, etc. If the investor does not comply with 
that plan, then the contract with him should be 
annulled immediately. The country would have 
leverage to regulate, represent, and protect 
national interests at the same time. Today, 
we have many examples of the investment 
of state resources in absolutely unproductive 
enterprises, for which the state is responsible. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: What are the national 
interests in the energy sector? I think that 
Kyrgyzstan is one of the rare countries with 
no set of national interests per se. There is 
nothing to position, neither inside nor outside. 
This is the reason why we have failing foreign 
policy. It is not clear what we want. Talking 
in economic terms, national interests are a 
certain commodity, which should be packaged 
somehow: in some kind of force, either military, 
economic, or ﬁ nancial. What are our national 
interests?
Abdyrashit Mukanbetov: National interest 
is a requirement to ensure the reliability and 
corresponding quality of our energy supply. 
The objective is to gain a proﬁ t, and therefore 
there is a need to combine interests within the 
constitutional contract, which will be reviewed 
by the Parliament and which can be canceled 
if needed. The only concern is that concession 
within the framework of the political contract 
is actually a long-term lease of assets. If we 
transfer the energy system to companies, how 
will they leave us with them in 10-20 years? 
However, the concession is good, in the sense 
that the property remains in the ownership of 
the state or of a Joint Stock Company. 
Ilyas Davydov: Much depends on the 
professional qualities of cadres: if cadres are 
well distributed, then there will be reliability. 
We need to learn, to gain experience from 
other countries like Kazakhstan and Moldova. 
The level of reliability, the level of operation 
and maintenance, is different to maintain 
everywhere. This is the ﬁ rst reason. Second 
is that in Almaty, the energy sector was 
sold for 5 years and tariffs were raised by 
5 cents. The former mayor of Almaty said: “I 
would better shoot myself.” They redeemed 
everything for 100 million USD. Therefore, 
when considering concession, it is obligatory to 
agree upon reliability, quality, returns, attraction 
of investments, and training of personnel. 
Investors also come for proﬁ t, if it is in their 
interest.
Muratbek Iman?liev:  This is a problem of 
semi-literacy. All our problems arise from the 
fact that we ﬁ rst sign, and then start studying 
the conditions. 
Nadejda Davletalieva: I was most surprised by 
the company “Alyans.” We have had the possibility 
to directly communicate with their personnel. 
Everyone had the opportunity to ask questions, 
clarify unclear details, and get consultations. 
There was no comprehensive reduction in 
staff, as is often done in other companies. A 
special department of management worked, 
and everyone was engaged in management, 
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even elderly specialists over sixty years of age. 
The head of the workshop said that he did not 
know what the management was per se, he was 
not interested in planning how it would be, as a 
department in charge of planning worked, and 
the specialist did not know where the money 
came from or who ﬁ nanced the production. Now 
the management starts from the employees. 
They assess the state of equipment, what 
should be done, develop a business plan and 
decide what to buy and what to produce. All 
decide together what to invest money in and 
discuss questions of security. 
Aigul Sultankulov: All these problems would 
be resolved gradually, if energy security, our 
national interest, was a priority. I will mention 
the example of Armenia: they faced a similar 
situation: high corruption and poor energy 
supply. What did they do? The President of the 
country, Prime Minister, and Minister of Defense 
hired a manger, a citizen of Russia with rich 
experience, who proved his competence. His 
salary was 5 thousand dollars. However, when 
a person earns money legally and also enjoys 
the support of the top leadership of the country, 
it is ok. When someone tried to pressure or 
give instruction on what to do, he would make 
one or two telephone calls, and that was it. This 
scheme started working slowly: He could turn 
off one mechanism and turn on another one. 
Nurdin Abdyldaev: It is natural that we cannot 
demand much from a person until we provide 
him with decent salary. 
Azamat Temirkulov: I agree with the idea that 
however we position ourselves determines 
what kind of investors will come to our country. 
Shairbek Juraev: For an average citizen, 
the issue of national interests is related to the 
fact that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are very 
much in need of our water, which we waste as 
we want. If this process would be controlled by 
private individuals, then the government would 
loose water as a leverage point. Does this 
problem exist?
Nadejda Davletalieva:  The thing is that it 
was stated from the beginning that for the time 
being, the national production networks of 
Kyrgyzstan would belong to the state; that is, 
they would not be transferred to concession or 
sold. Therefore, the issue of regulating water 
and energy resources is under the jurisdiction 
of the government, which is not disputed yet. 
Today, the question is only about the transfer of 
power distribution companies and the Bishkek 
city heating network. Even basic principles 
of regulating the water and energy process, 
developed by the Government, stipulate that 
investors can participate only in construction of 
new objects. 
Abdyrashit Mukanbetov: Regardless of the 
fact that the control package belongs to the 
government, there are deﬁ ciencies. We have 
not signed a contract on regulating the water 
and energy balance of Baryn-Syrdarya basin 
with Uzbekistan yet. Today, unfortunately, we 
started letting water pass in order to export 
electric power to Kazakhstan and Russia. That 
is exactly what Uzbekistan needs: water is 
ﬂ owing in, and they are under no pressure to 
sign a contract to supply us with the gas that 
we need. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: In conclusion I want to 
say that our country (at least in this region) is 
the only country where a national development 
concept is lacking. The word “concept” implies 
a certain strategy on the basis of national 
interests. Our neighbors – Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and others – have already 
elaborated a certain strategy for their national 
development, and we have nothing with which 
to oppose them.  If we have nothing to oppose 
with, then it is difﬁ cult to be competitive in such 
a tough environment. Methods of force in the 
struggle for prosperity and a place under the 
sun cannot be abolished by anyone, no matter 
what we say as we witness it.
At this roundtable, we have once again become 
convinced about the necessity for a strategy for 
developing the energy system, at the base of 
which the problems of energy security would 
lie. As derivatives from this thesis – both cadre 
changes and ﬁ nancial and material bases 
will be resolved, provided that we put the 
whole system in order. Thank you all for your 
interesting statements. 
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Although more than once in history Kyrgyz 
possessions stretched for ten thousand 
kilometers, there were never any regions 
(rayons) or oblasts. The Kyrgyz method 
of social organization regarding territorial 
governance was always restricted to two 
formats: the governance of territory by clan, 
and governance by the activities of joint armies. 
In modern language, there was a central power 
with strict functional limitations, and a sphere 
of regulation and local self-government.  There 
was nothing apart from that. 
The system of sub-state territorial administration 
historically emerged as a consequence of a 
feudal-monarchical system of governance, that 
is to say, from a system that the Kyrgyz people 
had never principally experienced.
This system was introduced to the Kyrgyz 
community and into Kyrgyz land from two 
sides. The ﬁ rst time – to a lesser degree – it 
was introduced by Ferghana khanates through 
the system of local governors. Later, it was 
imposed by Russia after Kyrgyz lands were 
forcefully annexed. The Russian system of 
administrative division, which emerged from 
speciﬁ c principalities (udel’nie knyzhestva) and 
modernized into provinces (gubernatorstva),
uyezds, and volosts, was introduced into the 
Kyrgyz environment.
This system was received without particular 
resistance, since it opened the door for 
patrimonial elites to govern wider territories 
and communities, and since natural domination 
over other clans was acquired without wars 
or internecine ﬁ ghting. Historical evidence 
shows that within this system of territorial-
administration governance, new to the Kyrgyz 
people, the struggle for ruling positions was 
serious, which has greatly spoiled the original 
mentality of Kyrgyz community. 
Especially serious negative transformations 
took place during Soviet times, when the whole 
structure of administrative governance was 
formed based on a top down hierarchy. 
Attempts to introduce some kind of 
economic sense into the system of territorial-
administrative governance (divisions) did 
not bring any improvements, since it is hard 
to talk about the existence of any integrated 
economic cycle on such small scales. Any 
division into territorial “national economic 
units” (narodnohozyaystvennie komplexi)
was absolutely artiﬁ cial. As a result, the 
division into oblasts and regions was in no 
way connected with either the realities of local 
social organization, or economic rationality, and 
became fully a means of political management 
(as happened in the Ferghana valley), or a 
natural geographic division into districts, as 
happened with the regions of Naryn and Talas. 
The consequences of such divisions were 
disastrous.
First of all, many preexisting social groups (clans 
and group of clans) were artiﬁ cially divided, 
which led to the beginning of the disintegration 
of the clan system, and consequently of the 
clan-based system of norms and values. If 
today we talk about the loss of social morals, 
then we need to understand that one of the main 
reasons for this loss is the “depersonalization” 
of clan system of social organization – the 
substitution of manap and aksakal authorities 
by that of chairman and akim.
DOES KYRGYZSTAN NEED RAYONS AND OBLASTS? 
The history of our country logically leads to conclusion that we must create a new, effective 
system of territorial-administrative division based on national principles of social organiza-
tion. This system must have only two levels: the center, with clear functional limitations, and 
a fully-authorized plenipotentiary local self-government.
Valentin Bogatyrev
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Secondly, a process of isolation was started 
for certain territories in the country, rather than 
a process of integration and homogenization. 
Development planning and distribution of 
economic activities, ﬁ nancial and transportation 
ﬂ ows were retained from country to oblast 
format.  Today we have three sad consequences 
because of such a policy: (1) the division of 
the country and people into north and south, 
into the regions of Talas, Naryn, Osh, Chuy, 
etc., (2) the sharp differentiation in character 
and level between different parts of the whole 
country – the of Kyrgyz Government, and (3) 
the exceptionally weak development of the 
national communications network. 
Thirdly, goal deﬁ nition and development 
planning grew disengaged from the real 
needs of local communities. Pishpek (Frunze, 
Bishkek) and oblast centers began to 
concentrate more resources for development 
by replacing people’s goals with the goals of 
the governing bureaucracy. An insurmountable 
gap was formed between cities and rural 
regions, between the center and the periphery. 
Inhabited areas and economic activities have 
started rapidly declining; villages (auly) and 
even small cities have been neglected in terms 
of economic, social, and cultural aspects.
Fourthly, a class of administrative heads was 
formed and began to multiply independently, 
who were neither real leaders of people or 
communities (since communities did not 
delegate them power), nor real managers or 
governors (since there was nothing to govern), 
but just distributors. This huge machine, 
consisting of “chiefs” of different levels, became 
a self-sustaining force that functioned basically 
for its own interests. An enormously inefﬁ cient 
country has been the consequence of this 
foreign system that was introduced into the 
Kyrgyz social substance. 
There are other negative consequences of an 
economic, socio-cultural, demographic, and 
ethno-genetic character, which resulted from the 
historical fact that Kyrgyz people rejected their 
own original system of social governance. 
Anticipating the accusations of local modernists 
deriding a “return to the past, to archaic 
forms,” it is worth making a statement that that 
governance based on local self-governance 
and on a limited and strictly regulated central 
government (which is exactly what we had 
before the Russians came) is not the past, but 
the future that all developed countries dream of 
and strive for today. 
Having a millennium of experience with the 
lifestyle organized in that manner, we are 
now trying to introduce its “vaccinated” form, 
offered by western scientists. It is like drinking 
concentrated Coca-Cola instead of jarma: it is 
sweet, but does not quench one’s thirst.
The history of our country logically leads to the 
conclusion that we must create a new, effective 
system of territorial-administrative division 
based on the national principles of social 
organization. The system must have only two 
units: a small center with clear restrictions on its 
authorities and functions, and a fully-authorized 
plenipotentiary local self-government.
Only ﬁ ve components must deﬁ ne the functions 
and authorities of the Center. 
- The Center is responsible for the security of 
the country. 
- The Center establishes and maintains rules 
on social behavior and economic activities. 
- The Center establishes standards in 
education, health, and quality of services. 
- The Center represents the country and 
protects the interests of its citizens in all 
foreign relations.
- The Center provides high-quality public 
services to the population. 
In order to realize these functions, it is necessary 
to have no more than ﬁ ve Ministries and several 
national systems such as tax, education, health, 
law-enforcement (courts and local police), and 
a network of conveniently located public service 
centers, where people could get their pensions, 
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references, information, register business, etc.
This is a completely different system compared 
to the one which exists now. 
Still, even the current system already has a 
number of components that are substantially 
pushed in right direction. In the presence 
of political will, it is possible in 3-5 years to 
implement real state reform, instead of that 
quasi-reform which has lasted for ﬁ fteen years 
and which has received great amounts of foreign 
funding from many international organizations. 
This assistance is still going on, and we will not 
see the end of it, because the real goal of the 
processes that is going in this area is to receive 
money for reforming, but without implementing 
actual reforms.
It is necessary to make one important warning 
here.  If we do not want complete disintegration 
and chaos in the country, we should not make 
any radical changes without ensuring some 
conditions for transformation. 
There are at least three such conditions: 
1. It is necessary to create a qualitative legal 
platform, a package of laws that have 
provisions on innovations and descriptions 
of transitional regulations. Such a platform 
could be made within the frameworks of 
Constitutional Reform, if a new system 
of governance is envisaged in the new 
Constitution. None of current Constitutional 
drafts are oriented towards such a change. 
2. It is necessary to break the resistance to 
reforms on the part of the current state 
machine.  For that goal, it is necessary that 
a) the project on reforming is developed 
outside of state structures, not under 
the direct patronage of the President; b) 
reforms are discussed and accepted by civil 
society and parliament, and if necessary, on 
fundamental issues they should go through 
referenda; c) we address the problem of 
adaptation for a huge army of bureaucrats, 
who will be left without jobs or their usual 
status in the society. There should be a 
speciﬁ cally designed program to this effect.
3. It is necessary to strengthen a new system 
of local self-governance. 
The local level must be the leading, key level. 
Local self-governance must take the main 
responsibility for matters in the communities. 
Thereupon, two important steps should be 
made.
The ﬁ rst one is to introduce clear differentiation 
between the authorities and functions of state 
agencies and those of local self-government. 
The direction in this case is singular: local self-
government must become the basis of society. 
Only by delegating authorities to the local level 
is it possible to establish real democracy. The 
Government should be responsible only for 
those issues which cannot be solved locally. 
Currently, there are two shortcomings in 
this area: confusing laws and cumbersome 
structure. Previously accepted laws on local 
self-governance should be carefully examined, 
as many norms contradict each other. Not only 
the heads of ayil okmotu, but even Bishkek 
theorists on local self-governance are confused 
as to who is responsible for what and who 
should do what. 
The structure of local self-governance also 
needs improvements. Some think that we have 
too many ayil okmotu, and that we should 
reduce the number by half and make each 
twice as large so that all territories of local self-
government become more self-sufﬁ cient.  
The second step is to provide local self-
governance with a real capacity to solve issues 
regarding the vitality and development of their 
territories. Under the current system of local 
budget formation, only a third of all ayil okmotu 
have the capacity for self-ﬁ nancing. Analysis 
done in some ayil okmotu has shown that local 
tax, excises, and non-tax revenues that form 
the income part of the budget make up 6.2 % 
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in Naryn oblast, 14.4% in Jalalabad oblast, in 
Osh city – 33.5%, and in Chuy oblast – 25.1%. 
At the same time, transfers (categorical, 
equalizing grants) to Naryn oblast stand at 89%, 
to Jalalabad oblast – 70.8%, to Chuy oblast 
– 40.8%, to Osh city – 40.0%. These ﬁ gures 
indicate that the current system of local budget 
formation is absolutely incorrect. Not only does 
it not provide funding for local development 
programs, but it also does not stimulate ayil
okmotu to increase their revenues.
In 2005, the combined incomes of the local 
budgets, without transfers, were only 20% 
of the national budget, and when taking into 
consideration their share in the national budget, 
then it is much less – almost 16%. 
A contradiction is present between the policy 
of local self-governance development and its 
real ﬁ nancial and economic substance. In fact, 
local self-governance agencies are put on 
their knees before the central agencies, they 
are more concerned about receiving ofﬁ cial 
transfers than about mobilization of local 
resources or local initiatives. 
Serious steps should be made toward removing 
this contradiction. The share of local budget in 
the national budget should be increased by 
1.5-2 times at minimum. During the process of 
budget formation for 2007, it is necessary to 
consider the possibility of delegating to local 
self-governments, aside from local taxes, such 
sources of revenues as (1) income tax, (2) 
taxes from licensing, (3) 4% taxes from sales 
turnover, and (4) property taxes, taking into 
account the sustainability of the whole budget 
system of the country, of course. This process 
could possibly take 1-2 years, but it must be 
started by today.  
There is a need for ﬁ nancial decentralization. We 
must create such a system of income distribution 
as would disable the Ministry of Finance from 
being engaged in local self-governance.  It is 
useless for the Center to distribute the money 
of local communities. Local self-government 
agencies must themselves be interested in 
making the life of their inhabitants richer and 
in developing small business. This is the true 
path toward territorial development. This is 
real democracy. One could say conﬁ dently that 
today the Ministry of Finance is the main body 
behind the development of democracy in the 
country.  
At the same time, of course, a different level 
of activity is needed on the part of local self-
government. They must independently, 
under their own initiative, deﬁ ne their own 
development strategies, taking into account 
their own needs and resources.  We do have 
such work experience. Two years ago, centers 
of local development were established in some 
communities, which were then united to the 
national network of development. This initiative 
did not ﬁ nd any support from state authorities or 
foreign donors at that time, and could not count 
on a new budget basis for local self-governance, 
since no such bases were implemented into 
practice. Currently, we need to come back to 
this issue and give to local self-government not 
only the right to the use of their own resources, 
but also the right to make decisions as to what 
needs they should be used to address.
Nobody aside from local communities will be 
able to make people’s lives better and more 
comfortable in their little motherland – their 
own village or city, their own community – so 
that people would not have to move to Bishkek, 
Russia or Kazakhstan to earn money for life, 
family, and children and their education. 
Thus, we have quite a big task ahead, but at 
the same time one that is clear and simple. 
Realization of this goal is quite attainable, not at 
all utopian – under one condition, of course: that 
society wants it. There is hope that decisions 
of such scale and level will be incorporated 
into the programs of political parties and other 
social forces.
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Muratbek Imanaliev: Today, at this round 
table we would like to talk about relations with 
our biggest neighbor – China.  At that, we 
are having this meeting on the eve of the ﬁ rst 
ofﬁ cial visit of President Kurmanbek Bakiev 
to China on June 9. I assume that the public 
organizations that deal with international 
relations could assist in the preparation for 
this ofﬁ cial visit. In any event, for our institute, 
current relations with our neighbors, with China 
in particular, are issues of serious concern. 
Though you may disagree, I think that the 
foreign policy of our country faces problems 
in our relations with the biggest partners in 
the region. What should be done in order to 
advance to a more qualitative level in political, 
economic, and cultural cooperation? Certain 
problems are of great interest for Kyrgyzstan, 
considering that political and economic ﬂ ows 
are passing over our country. Even Tajikistan, 
which is considered to be the poorest country in 
our region, is somehow managing its situation 
by receiving large investments from Russia, 
Iran, and China, and establishing relations 
quite intensively. These ﬂ ows are passing us 
by, however. 
From my point of view, cooperation with China 
is one of our main avenues. I will remind you 
of the words of our ex-president, Akaev. When 
he was giving an interview to one American 
newspaper, he was asked the question: 
How does Kyrgyzstan envision its economic 
development without having an outlet to the 
ocean? Akaev ingeniously answered that the 
question was not correct, because Kyrgyzstan 
is located on the shore of the greatest ocean, 
China. I think these are very important words. 
In any case, I am deeply convinced that, current 
downturns notwithstanding, the low level of 
political cooperation with China (the fault for 
which I think lies on the side of Kyrgyzstan) and 
insufﬁ cient efforts in economic cooperation, all 
have only a temporary character. I believe in 
that.
According to their practices in international 
relations, as well as their rapid onrush of 
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development in all aspects of the term, 
we may say that China is one of the most 
economically important countries in the world. 
Furthermore, being one of the most important 
international actors, China will be the main 
partner of Kyrgyzstan in trade and economics, 
a situation from which we, de facto, cannot 
escape. Today, we need to think about how 
our economy will function in the so-called 
ruble-yuan monetary zone. I believe that this 
ﬁ nance and banking structure will develop with 
time. In general, the institutions, scientists, and 
public of Kyrgyzstan need to give more serious 
attention to the research of China. We need to 
know the Chinese culture, language, economy, 
and people – their psychology. With this great 
country, we must establish cooperation that is 
effective and useful to Kyrgyzstan. We have an 
idea of creating a research center under our 
institute, which would focus on China and its 
relations with the Central Asian states. In this 
sense, we are ready to pursue serious and 
effective cooperation with the Research Center 
on China and Regional Cooperation, which is 
headed by Mr. Chanachev, and with the center 
that operates under Bishkek Humanitarian 
University. 
Now, I would like to hear the ofﬁ cial position of 
our government concerning this issue. 
Kadyrbek Sarbaev: Let me express my 
gratitude for organizing this meeting, which 
is very important and necessary. Today, we 
are reaching conclusions regarding certain 
issues in Kyrgyz-Chinese cooperation as 
they have progressed throughout the year 
that followed the events of March 24, 2005. 
We, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, hope very much that this meeting will 
contribute to the further deﬁ nition of priorities in 
our relations with China. In the political arena, 
these relations have a systemic, balanced and 
reliable character, which directly facilitates 
efforts to make further use of available 
resources in advancing the spheres of trade 
and economic investment. Last year, not only 
could we maintain dynamic, positive movement 
in all priority avenues of Kyrgyz-Chinese 
cooperation, but, in fact, it should be stated that 
all aspirations of the Chinese leadership were 
satisﬁ ed regarding the increase of mutually-
beneﬁ cial connections between our countries. 
The Chinese side positively received the 
statement of our new leadership proclaiming 
devotion and continuity in our foreign policy 
toward China. The Chinese leadership also 
made a statement afﬁ rming the importance 
of friendly relations with Kyrgyzstan and their 
support for the new leadership of our country, 
as well as emphasizing the maintenance of 
sovereignty and stability, development of the 
economy, and improvement people’s lives.
At the same time, China conﬁ rmed its readiness 
to continue rendering necessary assistance 
and support to our country. Bilateral meetings of 
state leaders, which were conducted in Astana 
on July 5 within the framework of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, 
received a high appraisal. We consider it as 
an ofﬁ cial recognition of the new leadership in 
Kyrgyzstan. Working visits of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Otunbaeva Roza Iskakovna 
and Djekshenkulov Alibek, in December 2005 
earned positive credit. Otunbaeva’s visit was 
the ﬁ rst ofﬁ cial visit by representatives of the 
new Kyrgyzstani government which indicated 
a high level of bilateral cooperation. During 
the ﬁ rst days after the events of March 24, 
2005, a series of Chinese delegations visited 
Kyrgyzstan, and after one week, the SCO Chief 
Executive visited our country with his staff. 
During the meeting, support was expressed for 
the events that occurred in Kyrgyzstan.
Besides political cooperation, mention should 
be made of the positive dynamics in economic 
and trade relations. According to the data 
of the National Statistics Committee of the 
KR, the volume of trade turnover between 
Kyrgyzstan and China made up 129.5 million 
USD this year; that is to say, it has increased 
7.8% comparatively over the last year. Export 
was 26.6 million USD, and import was 102.9 
million USD. In addition, we were able to realize 
several big projects last year, construction of 
the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway for 
example. There had been no movement on 
this issue up until that time, but during our 
meetings we were able reach an agreement 
on this project at the expert level. Furthermore, 
Chinese experts have ﬁ nished restoration of one 
part of the Osh-Sarytash-Irkeshtam highway, 
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with a length of 17 km. Last year, the Chinese 
government continued to provide humanitarian 
aid to Kyrgyzstan: eighty-ﬁ ve million yuans 
were allocated to the implementation of socio-
economic reforms. 
However, there is also series of problems, 
ﬁ rst of all regarding the misbalance of trade 
to the advantage of China, stabilization of the 
investment climate in our country, and domestic 
trade disputes. Second, attention must be 
given to the improvement of international 
trade infrastructures, including customs points, 
transportation, and banking services. The 
customs services of our countries need to 
perform veriﬁ cations on each other, as the data 
on sales differ by up to 800 million USD. Third, it is 
necessary to concentrate our efforts on realizing 
several projects of great potential for us, such 
as the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-
Uzbekistan railway line, complete restoration 
of the Osh-Sarytash-Irkeshtam highway to a 
second check point which connects us with 
China, and other projects in the energy sphere. 
Our experts are conducting consultations on 
the transferal of electrical energy through China 
to “third countries,” as well as the exportation 
of great supplies of electrical energy to China. 
We are not able to simply supply it now; 
currently, we do not have enough electricity 
transmission lines. In order to build the lines, 
we need approximately three million USD, and 
in order to make returns on that money, there 
must be a long-term agreement with China. 
Fourth, the sphere of communication is quite 
a prospective area. These avenues should be 
the focus of our attention. In addition, there is a 
need to take into account the fact that China is 
growing and developing economically, and that 
the growth rates are high. We should establish 
relations with and adapt to the experiences of 
the neighboring autonomous regions of China. 
In our opinion, one of the paramount tasks of 
the two countries is the consolidation of joint 
efforts for achieving the program of cooperation 
in trade and economy until 2014, which was 
signed two years ago. One of the priorities 
and prospective directions for cooperation 
between Kyrgyzstan and China should be the 
development of mutually-beneﬁ cial cooperation 
within the framework of the SCO. We are 
vesting big hopes that the new government will 
achieve previously set goals and objectives on 
the acceleration of our economic development. 
A grant for 900 million USD given by Chinese 
government has begun to be implemented, 
as evidenced by the cement factory and 
other projects that are under consideration 
by the Chinese government. Now, there are 
negotiations with “Ineksimbank” of China, 
whom the government commissioned to give 
credits under certain conditions. Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan, for example, are taking credits on 
a governmental guarantee, which we cannot 
afford to do because of our large debt. We have 
to develop other schemes of attracting these 
credits without governmental guarantees. 
I would like to thank the organizers of 
this meeting, because there is need for a 
breakthrough in our relationship. Positive 
relations have been maintained; that is to say, 
the main task for this year has been achieved. 
We need to go further, to open new prospects 
and prioritize our directions. Right now, we are 
working on organizational issues involving the 
state visit of President K. Bakiev to China June 
9-10. After that, on June 15, there will be an 
anniversary summit of SCO in Shanghai. We 
think that these upcoming visits symbolize the 
strength of sustainable development of China-
Kyrgyzstan cooperation. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: I would like to address a 
more concrete question to our guest and friend, 
Chinese Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Zhang Yannian: What are the interests of China 
regarding Kyrgyzstan after the events of March 
24, 2005?
Zhang Yannian: Dear guests and friends, 
it is an honor for me to be present at this 
roundtable, at which we are discussing 
relations between China and Kyrgyzstan after 
the events of March 24, 2005. On behalf of the 
Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan, and from me 
personally, I would like to express my sincere 
gratitude to all participants of this roundtable. 
As everybody knows, after the events of March 
24, great changes have taken place in the 
political situation of the Kyrgyz Republic, which 
still faces serious tasks in the achievement 
of stability and development. However, due 
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to the wisdom of the Chinese and Kyrgyz 
leadership, the relationships between them 
continued to develop further. The new Kyrgyz 
government has many times conﬁ rmed its 
foreign policy, including its policy towards 
China. The Chinese government respects the 
choice of the Kyrgyzstani people, and supports 
efforts directed toward the development 
of its sovereignty, protection of territorial 
integrity, maintenance of stability, economic 
development, and improvement of people’s 
living standards.
We are satisﬁ ed with the current relations 
between Kyrgyzstan and China. The leaders of 
our two countries are in constant communication. 
Earlier, representatives of China and then 
acting President Bakiev met during the SCO 
summit in Astana. Bilateral meetings were 
held, during which many important agreements 
were reached. During and after those bilateral 
meetings, the heads of the two governments 
exchanged opinions on the realization of 
their agreements. A special representative of 
China’s Chairman was present during Bakiev’s 
inauguration as president, and met with the 
heads of parliament and government. Such 
kinds of contact play an important role in the 
development of relation between two countries. 
In the sphere of economic development, there 
is a certain success, about which Mr. Sarbaev 
has already spoken. According to Chinese 
customs data, in 2005 sales have increased 
more than 60%, reaching 970 million USD. 
Representatives of the Chinese government 
are encouraging Chinese enterprises to 
invest capital in Kyrgyzstan, to create new 
factories here. Our economy has achieved 
great successes, but China continues to be 
a developing country with a large population. 
However, that fact notwithstanding, the 
Chinese government provides Kyrgyzstan with 
humanitarian aid according to its capability. 
In 1995, China presented to the Kyrgyz 
government 70 million USD on a grant basis. 
Furthermore, some Chinese governmental 
bodies have provided certain Kyrgyz structures 
with material and technical assistance. 
We hope that stability will be established in 
Kyrgyzstan. We also hope that assistance 
and credits on behalf of China will be used 
correctly, contributing to the development of 
the economy and the improvement of people’s 
lives in Kyrgyzstan.
In 2005, the number of Kyrgyz citizens who 
had visited China reached 20 thousand. In 
addition, Kyrgyzstan and China are actively 
cooperating within the framework of the United 
Nations and SCO, international and regional 
organizations. Since the events of March 24, 
relations between China and Kyrgyzstan have 
been strengthening, and have now reached 
a stable basis for constant development. 
They correspond to the vital interests of the 
two countries’ peoples. The treaty on good 
neighborliness, friendship, and cooperation 
between China and Kyrgyzstan until 2014 has 
deﬁ ned a line of development in the relations 
of the two countries. In May of last year, acting 
president K. Bakiev said: “Kyrgyzstan should 
come back home to Central Asia. It should 
develop relations with neighboring countries.” 
On May 12, 2006, during a meeting with heads 
of state from Germany, China, Kazakhstan, the 
USA, Japan, Hungary, and Poland, he said that 
Kyrgyzstan has established close relations with 
its neighbors. Our cooperation extends to the 
territory of the former USSR, and only then to 
the European countries and the USA. Without 
exaggeration, China constantly follows good-
neighborly relations, stands up for the security, 
stability and peace of our neighbors, for the 
general prosperity of our neighbors’ economies. 
I am conﬁ dent that, under the guidance of 
our leaders and through our general efforts 
(including today’s meeting), our relations will 
certainly receive further close cooperation.
Having read your invitation, I understand 
that this round table is meant as preparation 
for giving recommendations to K. Bakiev’s 
visit to People’s Republic of China. This is a 
very important visit. As is known, visits are 
subdivided into four categories: state, ofﬁ cial, 
private, and working. This visit is the highest – 
on the state level, and it has great importance, 
as well as the visits of two ministers of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. China very much 
appreciates the attitude of relations between 
our countries. During this visit, the heads of 
two countries will exchange their opinions 
concerning a deepening of mutual trust and 
-32-
Cooperation between China and Kyrgyzstan after March 24, 2005
K
Y
R
G
Y
ZS
TA
N
 B
R
IE
F 
  I
ss
ue
 ?
 5
expansion of cooperation, and will discuss 
concrete economic issues. I am conﬁ dent that 
this visit will be successful, and that China 
will become a still better neighbor, friend, and 
partner for the Kyrgyz people.
Muratbek Imanaliev:  We shall continue our 
roundtable, and the ﬂ oor is given to Erlan 
Abdyldaev, the former ambassador of Kyrgyz 
Republic to China. 
Erlan Abdyldaev: Dear colleagues, I would 
like to touch on some themes concerning the 
relations between China and Kyrgyzstan after 
March 24. Some aspects of my speech will 
correlate with the previous speakers. Other 
aspects will differ. Yet, we all have a common 
conclusion: all of us hope and believe in 
stability, and in the pragmatism and reliability of 
our relations. Since the events of March 2005, 
passions have not been quenched. A political 
strike continues in the country, using methods 
of street democracy. It is quite obvious that 
without achieving a consensus between the new 
authority, new opposition, and civil society, this 
process of contention can take on a long-term 
character, which will not expedite Kyrgyzstan’s 
exit from the current economic and political 
crisis. The uncertainty and unsteadiness of the 
country’s internal political situation is aggravated 
by uncertainty in the new administration’s 
foreign policy priorities. Domestic instability 
and frailty result in instability and degraded 
priorities in the foreign policy of the country, 
and also in spontaneous, not well-thought-out 
foreign policy actions and statements, which 
can have long-term negative inﬂ uences. Within 
one year, we have observed the multi-vector 
statements – in their essence and content – of 
our leadership concerning both our neighbors 
and major powers.  All these factors also affect 
relations with our neighbor, China. 
Before the visit of President Bakiev to China, 
I would like to state my thoughts concerning 
the present condition and prospects of our 
relations. That is to say, it would be expedient 
to state a real assessment of our interrelations 
with China from 1991 to this day – what could be 
put in an active balance, and what could be put 
in a passive balance for this period.  Certainly, 
the areas of political, defense and border 
security cooperation could be considered a 
positive achievement. In contrast, despite the 
growth of ﬁ gures in bilateral trade which were 
stated previously, and the intensity of economic 
relations at the local level, I would nevertheless 
put trade and economic cooperation in a passive 
balance of our relations. According to the 
experts of many countries, we have achieved a 
high level of political and military cooperation in 
the post-soviet period. As evidence, we could 
site the following examples: the exc hange of 
credits at the top-level and the signing of a range 
of important documents, such as the treaty on 
good neighborliness, the agreement on the 
settlement of border issues, the agreement on 
the struggle against separatism, extremism, 
and terrorism, the Shanghai and Moscow 
Agreements, etc. As Ambassador Zhang has 
stated, these agreements were the stabilizer of 
our relations after the events of March 24, and 
they have stood the test of time.
It is also necessary to note that Kyrgyzstan 
has invariably supported China on issues that 
are especially sensitive to Beijing: issues with 
Tibet and Taiwan, the struggle with Xinjiang 
separatism, etc. These issues have implications 
for Kyrgyzstan also, for its territorial integrity, 
and here again, Beijing has also invariably 
supported the efforts of Kyrgyzstan to maintain 
our sovereignty and independence. Similar 
assistance has been rendered when the south 
of Kyrgyzstan experienced attacks by terrorist 
bands. Such close cooperation invariably found 
reﬂ ection in the documents signed in recent 
history. The fact that China, for the ﬁ rst time in 
its history, carried out antiterrorist exercises on 
the border, involving the transferal of military 
units across the border, in October, 2003 also 
demonstrates a high level of political trust and 
close cooperation. China has continued to 
carry out similar exercises not only within the 
SCO framework, but also with other countries. 
Our high level of political understanding will 
also allow us to solve a boundary dispute 
between China and Kyrgyzstan on a mutually-
acceptable basis. It is necessary to note that 
the given question was a key issue throughout 
the 1990’s. The development of relations in 
other spheres was directly dependent on the 
issue of a boundary dispute. Ratiﬁ cation of 
the border agreement by the parliaments of 
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the two countries has ﬁ nally led to the signing 
of an important treaty between our countries 
on good neighborliness, friendship, and 
cooperation, and has given a certain push to 
the development of relations in other spheres. I 
think all of us have felt a certain turn of interest 
toward us on the part of China.
Some ﬁ gures might serve to demonstrate this 
point: in 2001, by Chinese estimations, trade 
turnover between our countries was no more 
than 100 million dollars. In 2005, it reached 
700 million dollars. As a whole, the political 
interaction of the countries naturally ﬁ t in the 
foreign policy strategy of China in Central Asia. 
Within the framework of this strategy, Beijing 
considers Kyrgyzstan as a political partner; 
priority issues have been and are on the border, 
the support of China’s positions on Taiwan and 
Tibet, and the joint ﬁ ght with Xinjiang separatism 
and terrorism. During the last years, one 
more project has been added – the American 
military presence in the region. Beijing does 
not actively move against the US base, but 
does nevertheless assert that the given base 
has temporary character, and informs us that 
they are against any expansion of the base’s 
mandate beyond the Afghanistan frameworks 
for any reason. For the former leadership of 
Kyrgyzstan, removal of political tensions in 
relations with China and establishment of good-
neighborliness with it were priorities in foreign 
policy. At the same time, the advancement 
to a certain level of political cooperation with 
Beijing was considered by Bishkek as a basis 
for expanding connections in other areas, in the 
economic sphere ﬁ rst of all – the attraction of 
investments and realization of large economic 
projects.
However, if the ﬁ rst political objective was 
reached by the previous leadership, the 
economic objectives have remained unrealized. 
Absence, or better to say failure in promoting 
economic cooperation with China is not an 
exceptional case for us. Failures are due to 
the fact that this cooperation has been much 
politicized by both countries, as well as to a 
lack of good management, correct calculation 
of projects, and voluntarism in decision-making. 
Such a fate, as everybody knows, has grasped 
the Kyrgyz-Chinese paper-mill, match factories, 
etc. Large-scale politics is present even during 
the discussion of constructing the China-
Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, and also of 
the export of Kyrgyz electrical power to China. 
Both projects concern not only sociopolitical 
aspects of two countries, but also political and 
economic interests of third countries.
These exact circumstances, along with 
indistinctly designed economic and ﬁ nancial 
aspects, most likely do not provide a basis to 
hope for their realization in the near future.
If speaking about present cooperation, the 
events of March 2005 and the resulting political 
developments in the country have caused a 
suspicious attitude on the part of Beijing. Despite 
the obvious aggravation of political crisis in the 
autumn of 2004 and winter of 2005, the Chinese 
government did not expect the sudden fall of 
the former leadership of Kyrgyzstan and rise 
to power of oppositional forces. Vigilance and 
anticipation on the part of Beijing towards the 
new authorities of our country are caused by 
a range of circumstances: continuing instability 
in Kyrgyzstan; the absence of unity, not only 
between the branches of government, but also 
in the governmental team on key questions of 
strategy development for the country; the rise 
to power of some oppositional leaders who 
advocate anti-Chinese positions; instability in 
the priorities of the new leadership; a lack of clear 
continuity, common approaches, or consistency 
in our political course concerning China;  the 
growth of destabilizing factors in frontier areas; 
and the strengthening of the western, ﬁ rst of 
all American, inﬂ uence. Together, these factors 
mean that the expectations of Beijing for K. 
Bakiev’s forthcoming visit will be connected, ﬁ rst 
of all, to a political component of cooperation. 
It seems like the Chinese leadership wishes to 
clarify as much as possible not only the position 
of the president on key questions of bilateral 
relations in regional and a world politics, but 
also our ﬁ rmness and invariance in a long-
term prospect. For Beijing, the main issue is 
the opportunity to establish and restore mutual 
political trust between the two countries. The 
desire and readiness of Beijing for this step will 
depend, most likely, on the ﬁ rmness of position 
of the new Kyrgyz leadership on questions 
related to issues involving Taiwan and Tibet, 
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the joint ﬁ ght against Xinjiang separatism 
and terrorism, reform at the Security Council 
of the United Nations, and also continuity 
and adherence of Kyrgyzstan’s leadership to 
previously-signed treaties and agreements: 
on the settlement of border issues, and on the 
American presence in Kyrgyzstan.
On the ﬁ rst two questions there should be no 
complications, but on the rest it is necessary to 
show political will during the decision-making 
process, because they touch not only internal 
political apportionments within country, but also 
mutual relations with other countries of dominant 
importance all over the world. An ofﬁ cial 
statement of the president of the KR on ﬁ rm 
adherence to prior-coordinated arrangements 
and agreements, in spite of the presence 
of internal political opponents, will facilitate 
the restoration of an atmosphere of political 
trust, as well as prospects for the realization 
of large economic projects. Questions on the 
American military presence in Kyrgyzstan and 
on the reform of the Security Council also will 
be on the agenda of the future visit. China has 
repeatedly declared that it understands and 
shares the position of Kyrgyzstan, which has 
given an air base to antiterrorist coalition forces 
in the struggle against terrorism in Afghanistan. 
The given decision was coordinated by the 
former leadership of Kyrgyzstan with partners 
in the CSTO and SCO, and has found reﬂ ection 
in the corresponding documents of the United 
Nations. However, China ﬁ rmly supports the 
deﬁ nition of time restrictions on the American 
presence in Manas, and is against expansion 
of its mandate. I think that this position of China 
is justiﬁ ed, does not contradict the obligations 
of Kyrgyzstan to the USA, and coincides with 
the position of the Russian Federation. 
China, which does not consider Kyrgyzstan 
as an economically prospective country, will 
not likely initiate independent projects during 
the visit, except for in the mining industry. In 
addition, the railway construction and export of 
electrical power are disputable due to economic 
efﬁ ciency and expense. Not less than 2 billion 
dollars are required in general. A separate 
question on the agenda, most likely, will be the 
granting of credit to Kyrgyzstan, either through 
bilateral cooperation or in the SCO framework. 
It is not in the interests of Bishkek to discuss 
the previous bitter experience of Kyrgyzstan 
receiving credits. More precise calculations of 
projects are necessary in order to avoid difﬁ cult 
ﬁ nancial positions or scenarios of failure. The 
possibility of a failure, taking into account all 
factors, is quite a bit higher.
As a whole, I believe that the president’s visit will 
mainly have a political character, and will aim at 
conclusion to the prolonged pause in Kyrgyz-
Chinese relations which developed after the 
March events. It is not realistic to expect from 
this visit breakthrough decisions in the area of 
economics. First, it is necessary to restore trust 
between the leadership of the two countries. The 
new, fourth generation of Chinese heads differs 
fundamentally from former heads who grew 
in concert with the Soviet Union. The people 
with whom our president must have difﬁ cult 
negotiations are pragmatists, technocrats. It is 
difﬁ cult on the one hand, but if decisions will be 
accepted on the basis of a healthy pragmatism, 
they will undoubtedly be stronger, determinable 
and stable. Without such visits at a high political 
level, we can hardly expect any advancement.
Muratbek Imanaliev: Thank you. I would 
like to comment on two important points, one 
economic and one political. Within the last year, 
I frequently heard from many politicians that 
Kyrgyzstan cannot support China on the issues 
connected with Xinjiang and Uighur separatism. 
I think that Kyrgyzstan supports the Chinese 
position on the struggle against separatism 
not because we make a courtesy to China. 
The problem is much more complicated. The 
position of Kyrgyzstan originates and should 
originate from its own internal problems. The 
problem of separatism, in any form, potentially 
exists in this country. Therefore, by supporting 
China, Kyrgyzstan supports itself, which should 
be clear to the new leadership of the country. If 
they do not understand this point, then they will 
not understand the problem of separatism. And 
the second issue I want to mention: I remember 
well that at the end of the 90s and beginning of 
the 21st century, the Kyrgyz side openly agreed 
on the issues of supplying electrical energy to 
China. Unfortunately however, our government 
became confused regarding its own interests 
and the interests of the country, so that nothing 
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could be reached. To what extent is China now 
interested in it? There is a political component, 
as well as an economic one. In 2000, the 
production increase was approximately 27,000 
megawatt, which, in order to translate into 
kilowatts, must be multiplied by 1000. In 2003, 
the increase was more than 40,000; in 2007-
2008, the increase will be 80,000 megawatt. In 
Russia, energy production will be 1,6 thousand 
megawatt, which surpasses Chinese energy 
production ﬁ fty times.
Marat Saralinovich, what do you think? What 
are the portrait characteristics of China, its 
factors and their importance to Kyrgyzstan? 
What does China mean to us and to all of 
Central Asia?
Marat Saralinov: I agree with many of the 
theses which have been elaborated, and 
I would like to say that for China, it is not 
important what color a cat is, black or gray, so 
long as it catches mice. That is to say, it is of 
no importance whether the state is big or small; 
the main thing is that this state is stable and 
reliable. In other cases, it is not necessary to 
cooperate or make any long-term plans. Since 
this round table is occurring on the eve of the 
president’s visit to China, I would advise our 
heads and diplomats to be extremely fair and 
objective with the Chinese heads and diplomats. 
It is necessary to ensure that their information 
coincides with the information provided by their 
ambassador. It is also necessary to deﬁ ne 
our national interests. That is to say, the visit 
should be prepared very carefully. It is possible 
to make casual remarks on projects, but the 
main need is to concentrate on convincing the 
Chinese side in the advisability of maintaining 
cooperation. As for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, it has done its work fairly and nobly. We 
have accomplished things that were necessary 
for the country: the som has been maintained, 
and great investments have been attracted, 
for which even many CIS countries cannot be 
praised. Still, economic cooperation with China 
has failed. We named a paperboard mill as a 
“sample of the Chinese-Kyrgyz cooperation.” 
In order to not repeat such occurrences, it 
is necessary to deﬁ ne professionally and 
objectively some objectives which would not 
demand too much time or resources, so that 
cooperation would be pragmatic. We speak 
much, but do nothing. Let’s construct a cannery. 
We have the raw materials. The government 
has to provide duty-free import of the equipment 
from China; this is in our interests. Visas should 
be issued for professional workers from China 
without delay. China is a rapidly developing 
country. Growth rates are high. I am simply 
delighted by China, and I would like them to 
share their experience with us. At present, we 
cannot do the same things.
Muratbek Imanaliev: How is the Kyrgyz public’s 
traditional conception of China displayed? How 
are they reﬂ ected in the interrelations with 
China at present? 
Valentin Bogatyrev: Thank you for the 
interesting question. I think that while answering 
this question, I will also touch some economic 
issues.
Maybe we were taught in this way, or maybe we 
are such people, but we always live with myths. 
Included is the fact that there are many myths 
about China. There are four most widespread 
myths. The ﬁ rst is a myth which spread about 
ﬁ fteen years ago about Chinese migratory 
expansion. Everyone shouted that Chinese 
people were buying houses and apartments 
in Naryn. Fifteen years have passed, and I do 
not see many Chinese people here, but the 
myth continues to live. When somebody says 
that Chinese workers will arrive here, imagine 
what kind of reaction there will be. There are 
no agreements yet regarding whether railways 
will be built or not, whether Chinese people will 
work there or not, or whether they will stay here 
temporarily or forever. 
The second myth is that China is interested 
in Kyrgyz electrical power. I specially visited 
Xinjiang in April, met with experts, and they 
were surprised: “Why do you think so? We 
have enough electric power ourselves.” 
The third myth is very widespread, that China 
is rich and can give us money, can pay for 
everything. We are going to sit on a narcotic 
needle of grants, at present on a Chinese 
needle of grants, which is very dangerous. 
When somebody gives a thousand units of 
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technical equipment, I have one question: 
what will be done with it? It will for certain be 
plundered, taken away, or resold. It seems to 
me that China, while always aspiring to assist 
Kyrgyzstan, should not repeat the same path 
as the West did, by giving grants and thereby 
corrupting the country and people.
The fourth myth is about the immense Chinese 
market, into which it is possible to enter with 
Kyrgyz goods and sell successfully. This is 
an illusion, which many of our citizens have. 
I will state that the Chinese markets are 
more prospective for us than the markets of 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, or Uzbekistan, because 
they have a slightly different structure. For 
example, nobody makes “SHORO” in China, 
while in Kazakhstan somebody does make 
“SHORO.” In China, there are niches where we 
could sell our products, but it requires work. We 
cannot simply go there and sell everything we 
want. Moreover, we do not know how to do that. 
About factories: I think, they should not be built 
here. The problem is that the modern economy 
develops through technological clusters, blocks 
in which goods pass in a chain from raw material 
up to ﬁ nal products. If we become part of such 
clusters, we shall successfully cooperate with 
China. Such kind of cooperation is necessary 
for us – not simply a factory, but an opportunity 
to work with the large companies, within their 
structures and networks.
Marat Saralinov: There were such kind of 
attempts, but it did not result in anything. No 
cluster could be made. It is better that Chinese 
people help us to sell raw materials. The most 
important thing, in fact, is marketing. If they 
arrive and say that there will be a cannery here 
in half a year, nobody will tell them a word.
Muratbek Imanaliev: There is also such a 
concept as an aqua-cluster. We have mountains 
and water, the largest natural resources. Water 
is a base of economic development. It can be 
used not only for watering, but also in public 
health services and industry.  It is possible to 
cooperate in this area not only with China, but 
also with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
Valentin Bogatyrev: The most interesting fact 
is that it is very difﬁ cult to enter the water market. 
How are we planning to do it? It is better if our 
water will be produced under a large Chinese 
brand. More important however is that the 
water have a label which would indicate that it 
is produced in Kyrgyzstan, in the same way as 
we sell paper, though it is made in Tashkent. 
In addition, I will touch cultural aspects. For a 
long time, I have had an idea of establishing 
a Chinese university in Central Asia. I have 
shared this idea with the Ambassador. 
Recently, I even visited the mayor of Tokmok 
city and suggested a visit to Beijing about this 
idea, referring to the fact that near Tokmok 
there is a house where Lu Bou lived. It should 
not be a university like Bishkek Humanitarian 
University, where just language and culture are 
taught, but exactly a Chinese university, where 
instructors would be Chinese specialists. They 
would teach ﬁ nance, in which Chinese people 
have succeeded, and other subjects.  There is 
a need for initial investments. The project would 
be commercial, and so people would have to 
pay for education. 
Unless we form a common area of meanings 
and language, things will be very difﬁ cult for us. 
I am glad that our youth is showing great interest 
in the study of China. I do not understand why 
there are so many our students in Turkey. What 
do they have to learn there? By the scale of 
inﬂ uence, and by neighborhood, we need to 
study in China. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: Thank you. I have such 
an impression that few people in this country 
realize what the SCO means to Kyrgyzstan. 
Please tell us about its major points. 
Jeenbek Kulubaev: Basically, the SCO is 
earning a very good image. This year we 
are celebrating SCO’s ﬁ fth anniversary. 
This organization is developing dynamically 
because political, rather than economic factors 
prevail on the agenda.  Lately, approximately 
40 delegations from different countries have 
visited the SCO Secretariat, and asked the 
same question. This question was very serious. 
During this year, many political statements and 
declarations were made; yet, in the sphere 
of economy we have not produced anything. 
Western countries, in particular Japan, are 
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interested in whether the SCO is still a military-
political block or whether it will carry out a large 
political project lead by Russia and China? 
This is a very important question. Participation 
in the SCO is advisable for us, because it is 
an elite political club. However, if members 
receive no economic beneﬁ ts, then after some 
time the SCO will simply become an “economic 
cooperation” that just produces many papers. 
It is necessary to fear this possibility. Firstly, 
there is no coordinating body on the SCO in 
Kyrgyzstan. There is a national coordinator, 
but he does not have the authority to give 
instructions on economic structures which 
would have any result. Secondly, lately several 
Ministers of Economics and Finance, Ministers 
of the industry of Kyrgyzstan, have changed, 
which directly inﬂ uences the country’s economic 
approach to the SCO. People from different 
ministries come to the SCO’s meetings; there 
is no continuity. In the end however, each 
meeting of the SCO is worked out in details. 
In other words, I want to say that we cannot 
participate here in economic terms anyhow. 
We, ﬁ rst of all, are interesting in China as a 
region. I am not speaking as a representative 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but as 
representative of the SCO. Currently, we are 
trying to reach an agreement on the Uzbekistan-
Kyrgyzstan-China railway, but Uzbekistan is 
ignoring our bilateral relations and refusing 
to have any negotiations. In other words, the 
project is hanging in the air.  There is an idea to 
continue the project on a bilateral basis, but the 
fact is that the project has a regional character, 
and the line cannot work without a continuation 
from Jalalabad to Torugarta. In that case, the 
project will be forgotten. We need to use the 
President’s visit and the SCO meeting in order 
to compel Uzbekistan work with us through 
China. I remember the difﬁ culties with which we 
initially agreed on Uzbekistan’s membership in 
the SCO. We warned beforehand that the SCO 
is a prospective organization; there is no need 
to enter for one who would impede any SCO 
activity. Now we already see the ﬁ rst features of 
such behavior from Uzbekistan. The president 
does not have visits every day; therefore, we 
must use the upcoming state visit in order to 
make China an intermediary in Kyrgyz-Uzbek 
relations, so to put an end to this issue and 
continue the experts’ work on the SCO project. 
Muratbek Imanaliev:  The idea of railway 
construction also relates to many of our 
internal issues. China and Uzbekistan do not 
need this road as much as we do. Our disorder 
and corruption have led to the complete end 
of negotiations on the railway. Stories about 
connecting Shanghai to Rotterdam in some 
ways resemble stories about Manas.  The 
idea of constructing this line as a whole 
involves forecasting economic relations 
between China and Uzbekistan. Though the 
idea has been maintained, there is no sharp 
need for the construction of this line, as there 
is for the line that would connect China and 
Kazakhstan. I am afraid that an idea to use 
China as the intermediary between Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan would be unsuccessful, 
because China will not agree to use political 
mechanisms in its relations with Uzbekistan 
to compel Tashkent to agree with our idea. It 
seems to me that the Kyrgyz people see it in 
this way: The Chinese will construct this road 
from their own money, and then will leave it 
in our hands, allowing us to do anything we 
want. My recommendation is not to raise this 
issue on railway construction. It will make an 
impression that Chinese people do not know 
politely refuse us with the export of electric 
energy and railway construction. This is just not 
a serious discussion. 
Jeenbek Kulubaev: You are talking about quite 
reasonable things, but we can raise this issue 
in the future because it is anyways perspective 
to China – more outputs are better for China. 
We also cannot just abandon the issue. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: I think China will strongly 
complicate this situation if it stretches the road 
from Ferghana to Xinjiang – from one difﬁ cult 
Muslim region to another. The Chinese need to 
think one hundred times before deciding. 
Erlan Abdyldaev:  I also think it is not necessary 
to burden these negotiations by such projects, 
where neither the economic risks, nor the 
political ones have been well calculated. In 
addition, there is no need to compel the Chinese 
side to make any statements. The railway can 
possibly be a good project, or possibly we 
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will not know or be able to control where this 
9 billion USD investment goes; that is to say, 
we can simply burry this money in the sand. 
Moreover, there is no stability in Kyrgyzstan. It 
is much better to consider all risks on the expert 
level and ensure that this project is beneﬁ cial 
to China and to us from an economic point of 
view. We already had a bitter experience with 
politicized projects. Why do we need another 
one?
I ﬁ nd unrealistic the idea that the SCO will help 
us solve our problems. Economic cooperation 
in the SCO framework is seriously slipping 
today. There is no joint approach between 
Russia and China in certain areas, and unless 
they establish deﬁ ned aspects in all spheres of 
their relations, economic cooperation within the 
SCO framework will continue to slip. Currently, 
everybody says that we have many projects in 
the SCO, but from where should the money for 
those projects be taken? Russia will not give it. 
Kazakhstan and China can give, but for what 
projects? What are the results of the SCO on 
its ﬁ fth anniversary, except for cooperation in 
the military-political sphere? The organization 
has become bureaucratic, and disputes are 
arising within, all of which should be avoided. 
Muratbek Imanaliev:  It is necessary to note that 
from the very beginning, the mission of the SCO 
was in the provision of security. The economic 
component arose during a later period, while 
even security issues have not been smoothly 
regulated in the SCO. The ﬁ fth anniversary is a 
holiday, but it is necessary to think what to do 
next. I have a question to Mr. Chanachev: What 
perspectives do you see in the development of 
Kyrgyz-Chinese cooperation? Taking all factors 
into account, what importance does it have for 
China and Kyrgyzstan? 
Marat Chanachev: Concerning the clusters, 
I would add that Kazakhstan has used them 
very well. Large capital investments go toward 
realizing development of the western areas of 
China, in particular Xinjiang. If, in 2003, the 
GDP of Xinjiang was 182 billion yuans, direct 
investments were about 100 billion yuans, or 
twelve billion dollars – almost half of the GDP. 
To develop Xinjiang, with such a population, is 
a large, capital-intensive project. Kazakhstan 
has entered this niche quite well. 
Even during Akaev’s regime, the head of Xinjiang 
visited Kyrgyzstan and wanted to develop trade 
relations. China, by investing great capital in 
the Xinjiang, is creating a signiﬁ cant potential 
there. Sooner or later, it will be necessary to 
enter Central Asian markets.  This idea can 
be considered during the development of joint 
projects on developing the western regions of 
China, in particular the Xinjiang. 
I also wanted to tell why there is a great 
difference between Chinese customs data 
and ours. To understand, it is enough to go 
Batkenskiy and Dordoy markets. This issue has 
been elaborated greatly in the framework of 
the SCO, and I have discussed it with Russian 
specialists. People already opened free trade 
zones long ago, because trade has advanced 
to higher level – from retail trade to wholesale. 
This phenomenon is especially appreciable 
regarding storage terminals. Transition in the 
market to direct communications between 
manufacturers and sellers is also characteristic: 
through Chinese cities, passing Urumchi 
market, the consumer himself searches for 
goods of favorable price and quality. We can 
also observe the transition of the market to yuan 
currency, or to som here. The nomenclature of 
goods has changed, whether the products are 
spare auto parts or furniture; the manufacturer 
passes goods to the consumer. Here again it is 
necessary to note that a free trade zone is one 
of the primary levels of integration. People have 
already found this form, while the governments 
still have not. Negotiations have been taking 
place for too long a period of time.  I agree 
with Valentin Borisovich that it is necessary to 
educate people not just in simple humanities, 
but to prepare a staff that will be able to work in 
such conditions. Sooner or later, other countries 
too will enter the SCO.
Muratbek Imanaliev: Thanks very much to all 
of you.
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The optimal model for the relationship between 
state authority and business has been always 
an object of quest in capitalist countries, since 
the economic welfare of the population, survival 
of the country, and realization of ambitious 
objectives set before leaders depend exactly 
on this model. 
In Kyrgyzstan, this issue is topical and relevant 
as never before. The experience of excessive 
intervention by state agencies and their 
representatives in the activities of entrepreneurs 
through tax, custom legislation, licensing, etc., 
distorts entrepreneurial activities and makes 
the country’s business climate unfavorable 
for investors. In fact, it is hard to ﬁ nd a case 
throughout the years of independence when 
the investments were attracted with the 
consideration of national interests. State ofﬁ cials 
are interested in the prosperity of certain sectors, 
which is why Kyrgyzstan’s economy engenders 
favoritism, corruption, ordered bankruptcy, 
and repartition of ownership.  As a result, the 
growth of investments and the economy are 
hindered overall. Business prefers neighboring 
Kazakhstan.
Lately, there have been attempts to improve 
the form of relationships between state 
structures and representatives of the private 
sector. Currently, representatives of business 
associations and state structures are discussing 
the Tax Code, which in its current version meets 
neither the interests of entrepreneurs, nor 
economic realities. The Ministry of Economics 
and Finance, together with representatives of 
business associations, is starting to develop a 
new law on investment. Customs inspection is 
attracting businessmen to its Public Council for 
the improvement of legislation. The Ofﬁ ce of 
the General Prosecutor is introducing a draft of 
the decree on the creation of a standard list on 
the audit of business structures by state bodies 
for the President’s consideration. 
However, these measures are not able to solve 
the problems of our business climate completely. 
In order to improve the current situation and to 
ﬁ nd the optimal model of relationships between 
state authority and business, it is ﬁ rst necessary 
to ask: how are the rights of businessmen 
protected. In Kyrgyzstan, it is unsafe and risky 
to have a business, which has been proved by 
a number of examples in which the Government 
has illegally interfered in business activities and 
created an unfavorable image of the country: 
ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL: FOR THE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION 
OF BUSINESS FROM GOVERNMENT
Today, in disputes with entrepreneurs, the Government represents both a disputing party 
and at the same time an arbiter. This circumstance induces Kyrgyz entrepreneurs to look 
for methods beyond the legal frameworks to resolve their disputes. Experts conclude that 
there is a necessity to delegate the functions of dispute resolution between Government 
and business to the International Arbitration Tribunal. 
Esenbek Urmanov, advisor to the director of the Public Fund “Bishkek Think Tank 
Projects”
Recall of a license from the company “Kyrgyz Air” 
In July 2003, the Department of Civil Aviation recalled a license from the air-company 
“Kyrgyz Air” for civic air service on the Bishkek-Moscow-Bishkek route. According to 
a statement by the air-company’s management, the Department of Civil Aviation did 
not have reasons for the withdrawal of the license. Moreover, the state department 
violated the procedure of revocation of the license. During the negotiations, the parties 
did not solve the conﬂ ict, which led to the end of the air-company’s activities. In that 
year, the founders of the company immediately ﬁ led a claim to the International Arbi-
tration Tribunal in London against state agency of Kyrgyz Republic – the Department 
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In many cases, entrepreneurs do not publicize 
these kinds of facts and do not appeal to state 
courts on economic affairs, because they do 
not believe in the possibility of just resolution 
of disputes or do not want to waste their time 
on prolonged dispute investigations. There are 
three instances in state courts during dispute 
investigation: the ﬁ rst court, the court of appeal 
and the supervision court, which overall take more 
than one year, which is of course unacceptable to 
the entrepreneurs.  It is much more proﬁ table for 
businessmen to pay off state ofﬁ cials or satisfy 
the claims of the state agency. Obviously, this 
practice does not promote business development 
in the country.
The question arises: how to resolve the disputes 
which emerge between businessmen and the 
Government? It is possible to give several 
recommendations and outline the consequences 
of the implementation of each recommendation. 
It would be logical to follow the general 
recommendations which are given by almost all 
interested parties. In particular, it is necessary to 
improve the skills of state specialists, increase 
the transparency of their activities, optimize tax 
and custom legislation, the order of licensing, 
etc., improve the functions of the court system 
through opposition to corrupt judges, and rule 
out the dependency of the judicial branch on the 
executive and legislative branches of power. 
The above listed measures were declared a 
long time ago, but no real results have been 
felt. Unfortunately, any programs for business 
development and protection by state agencies are 
sabotaged by state bodies that are not interested 
in changing the essence and character of their 
work. Radical reformation of state agencies and 
the court system require a lot of time, efforts and 
resources.  
International arbitration tribunal 
In this case, the option of delegating authorities on 
dispute resolution between businessmen and the 
state agencies of KR to the International Arbitration 
Tribunal (IAT) under the Trade-Industry chamber 
of the KR (TIC of the KR) is quite attractive. This 
of Civil Aviation (Government of the KR) – in the amount of several million USD (the 
sum cannot be disclosed now for several reasons) on the basis of investments expro-
priation by the Government of the KR. Currently, the arbitration proceeding is still in 
progress, causing enormous expenses and damages. In November 2004, the air com-
pany “Kyrgyz Air” was declared bankrupt, and is now in the process of liquidation.  
Detention of meat importers at the custom’s ofﬁ ce 
In February of this year, a big consignment of chicken meat was illegally detained. 
The reason for the detainment was refusal by custom inspectors to register the 
arrived load. The chicken meat was produced in Brazil and the U.S.A, where the 
pesthole of bird ﬂ u was absent.  The meat products had gone through several ex-
aminations, and the Department of Veterinary Affairs had stated that the products 
were safe to use. Nonetheless, the importers, whose load was in the custom’s ofﬁ ce, 
experienced heavy losses because of the forced stoppage.
Cutting off the NTS channel’s regional broadcasting 
On May 1, 2006 the channel NTS, which has earned a reputation as a professional 
and objective mass media source, was deprived from regional broadcasting. On NTS 
frequencies, the ElTV channel, which was established on the basis of Osh-3000 chan-
nel last year, started broadcasting.  Without going deeply into the underlying political 
reasons, it should be said that NTS has lost its orders from clients, advertisers and 
part of its audience. 
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measure, approved on the legislative level, has 
provided efﬁ ciency and objectivity during the 
consideration of economic disputes between 
businessmen and state agency.
Firstly, delegating the above described powers 
to the arbitration tribunal changes the state 
approach to business regulation and the discipline 
of state ofﬁ cials radically, by punishing them for 
Arbitration Tribunal 
The arbitration tribunal, according to Kyrgyz legislation, is an individual arbiter or board of arbiters which 
resolves disputes that occur as a result of civil relations, in which the sources of accepted decisions 
are the agreements of the disputing parties, business culture and norms, as well as current practices in 
considering disputes of a similar category. 
The main advantages of the investigation procedures of an arbitration tribunal are:
• Protection principles regarding the concrete interests of disputants on property, including the possibility 
to choose an arbiter; 
• Contestation of the disputing parties; 
• Speed and economy of trial proceedings; 
• Absence of the publicity found in lawsuits; 
• Convenience for the disputing sides regarding the time and place of dispute resolution.
By the initiatives of the conﬂ icting parties, the arbitration tribunal provides a wide range of choices on 
arbiters (the judges of the arbitration tribunal) from a list of independent and qualiﬁ ed experts.
In September 2002, the International Arbitration Tribunal under the Trade-Industry Chamber of the KR, 
which is standing arbitration, was ofﬁ cially registered in the Kyrgyz Republic. At the present time, the 
list of arbiters on the International Arbitration Tribunal includes 112 experts from 15 countries of Europe, 
North America, and Asia, including 53 international arbiters from England, Sweden, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
U.S.A., France, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Netherlands, Byelorussia, Turkey, India, Romania and Croatia.  The 
list of arbiters includes not only lawyers, but also experts in economics, ﬁ nance, and business. Decisions 
of the arbitration tribunal come into force after their pronunciation, and are not subject to appeal.
irresponsible and illegal activities. 
Secondly, the rights of national businessmen will 
be equalized with the rights of foreign companies 
by the legislature. At present, only foreign investors 
have the right to appeal to the arbitration tribunal, 
according to the law of the KR “On investments” 
(Article 18, part 2, paragraph “b”). 
Moreover, this measure meets the economic 
interests of Kyrgyzstan, since state agencies 
would be able secure their positions when bankrupt 
and improper foreign companies threaten to ﬁ le 
a claim to International Arbitration Tribunal in 
London. This measure excludes the expenditures 
for state personnel related to dispute resolution 
proceedings abroad, and positively inﬂ uences 
the international image of Kyrgyzstan. Hence, 
the delegation of warrants to the International 
arbitration tribunal under the TIC of the KR would 
partially bring the Kyrgyz economy into conformity 
with the theoretical requirements and practices of 
a liberal market economy.  
It is necessary to proceed from the fact that disputes 
between businessmen and state agencies arise 
in any case, despite the quality of developed or 
practiced legislative norms. Today, disputes are 
examined in state courts on economic affairs. In 
such disputes, the Government represents not 
only a disputing party on one side, but also an 
arbiter on the other side, which is fundamentally 
wrong. Delegation of the authorities on dispute 
resolution between private entrepreneurs and 
the Government to the IAT under the TIC of the 
KR would allow quick and efﬁ cient solutions on 
such issues as the protection of the rights and 
investments of businessmen without ﬁ nancial 
and time costs. 
